Sunday, August 13, 2017

THE JEWISH HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE THE GREAT BRITISH BETRAYAL OF THE JEWS


THE JEWISH HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE
THE GREAT BRITISH BETRAYAL OF THE JEWS


APPENDIX VI

THE HOME LAND CLAIM
Statement made by M. Van Rees, Vice-Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in Geneva, June 5, 1930
M. VAN REES thought it useless to draw conclusions from this, since they were obvious.
M. Van Rees, continuing, wished to examine the complaints of the Jews. No chapter of the Commission of Enquiry's report was devoted to the legal side of the position of the Jews in Palestine.
Only a passing reference was made to that situation, and there was no effort to explain the grounds on which the Jews inhabited Palestine nor up to what point are their demands must be regarded as legitimate.
Since any serious examination of the rights of the Jews to live and carry on their activity in Palestine was not to be found in the report, it was difficult not to draw the conclusion that this point of capital importance had not received in the report the attention which it deserved.
:4:
22I (222 THE GREAT BETRAYAL)
The Commission did not state that the Balfour Declaration was the basis of the presence of the Jews in Palestine and of their activities.
The Commission of Enquiry did not explain its views on the close connection between that Declaration and certain provisions in the Palestine mandate. It had confined itself to quoting them, but had refrained from giving any interpretation.
It had ended by recommending the British Government to explain more explicitly than had been the case in 1922 its policy with regard to the Jews. The most striking fact was that, although the report referred in many places to the official statements contained in the White Paper of June, 1922, the Commission seemed to have attached no importance to the basis of those statements which it did not even quote. Yet that basis was that "the Jewish people will be in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance" (see White Paper, page 30) .
Nevertheless, it was this statement of Mr. Churchill's which, by explaining the legal reasons for the re-establishment of the Jews in the country, furnished the key to that which was not clear in the report of the Commission.
The Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, as recorded in the Preamble and developed (APPENDIX VI 223) in Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and i i of the Palestine Mandate, had a very definite meaning.
It was not, as several persons had seen fit to interpret it, a mere gracious gesture, a mere public manifestation of indulgent pity toward the Jewish people.
It would be altogether too naïve to believe that this had been the only feeling inspiring Great Britain in her Declaration of November 2rid, 11917. It would be also equally naïve to believe that that declaration had been approved by all the Great Powers merely in order to please Great Britain or in order to show their sympathy for the Jews.
Interpreted in its own words and with the aid of the text of the mandate based upon it, the Balfour Declaration would be seen to be an act based on purely political considerations and designed to secure an eminently practical object.
That object had certainly not been the oppression of a people established in the country by another people, as the adversaries of the Declaration wished it to be believed, despite the reservations contained in the Declaration.
On the contrary, its object was the resurrection of the people established in Palestine. Its object was to arouse them from their centuries-old lethargy and to secure the social and economic development of the country, not by the efforts of the Administration alone, but by the active co-operation of a more energetic and more highly developed people.
In short, the real object of the Balfour Declaration had been the establishment, by the co-activity of the Government and of the Jewish people, of a social and economic order corresponding to the principles and requirements of European civilization, while at the same time respecting the rights and interests of the existing inhabitants.
It had been that reason, which, disregarding the other considerations relating to the primary interests of the Empire, had induced the Government to agree, in order to fulfill the mission which it had felt sure would be given to it at the end of the war, to allow the Jewish people to participate, not in the powers of administration of Palestine, but in the practical execution of that mission.
This conception appeared to be fully justified by the facts. It explained the reason why Mr. Churchill, as M. Van Rees had already pointed out, had been able to state that the Jewish people would be in Palestine "as of right"; or in other words, that that people would not enter the country as foreigners, but would belong to the Palestinian nation to be subsequently recreated.
It would further explain why Article 4 of the Mandate (APPENDIX VI 225) date officially recognized the Jewish organization as the organization representing the Jewish people and chosen to co-operate with the Government.
It further explained why Articles 6 and 7 referred to the special privileges enjoyed by
Jews in respect of immigration, the acquisition of Palestinian nationality and their establishment on empty land, subject to reservations regarding the rights and interests of other persons.
Finally, it explained why Article i i, of which the meaning was just as significant, expressly enjoined the participation of the Jews in the execution or exploitation of public works and services as well as in the development of the natural resources of the country.
All these provisions were closely interconnected.
They formed a single whole and clearly expressed the fundamental idea that to the work of civilization to be carried out in Palestine the Jewish element would contribute its moral and above all its material support, not in virtue of holding any kind of concession of an economic nature, but in virtue of its right to collaborate with the Administration. In this the Jewish activity formed an integral part of the economic evolution of Palestine, of which the mandate had been entrusted to the Mandatory Power and 'which was the primary condition of the political development of the country.
M. Van Rees thought it regrettable that this point had not been seriously considered by the Commission of Enquiry. It was even more regrettable that the special situation granted by the mandate to the Jewish element in Palestine appeared to have escaped the notice of the Administration itself to such a degree that the three statesmen whose names were specially connected with the Declaration of November 2nd, 1917-
Lord Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Smuts -had been led to state publicly that causes "which are still obscure have impeded the task of administration and consequently the full carrying out of the policy" (letter published by The Times, December 20th, 1929) .
It must be recognized that this was the, main substance of the Jewish complaints.
All the information which the Commission possessed regarding the manner in which the Mandate had been applied showed that the three statesmen whom he had just quoted had not been mistaken.
On the contrary, the fact was that, generally speaking, the clauses of the Mandate concerning the Jews had not, in practice, received that application which their authors might have expected; not, in the first place, owing to the voluntary (APPENDIX VI 227) opposition of the Administration, but in consequence, M. Van Rees thought, at any rate in part, of the misunderstanding of the special situation which the international obligations assumed by Great Britain had granted to Jewish people in Palestine.
At this stage, M. Van Rees would enquire whether the British Government substantially adopted the statement of the Shaw Commission to the effect that no premeditation and no organized revolt had occurred, for this point was not clearly stated in the British Government's memorandum.
Dr. Drummond Shiels replied in the affirmative.
The views of the British Government on this point were contained in that document .
M. Van Rees said that in that case he wished to explain his views on that part of the conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry.
As far as the question of premeditation was concerned, the Commission of Enquiry justified its conclusions by observing (paragraph 2 of its conclusions, page z58) that the disorders had not occurred simultaneously in all parts of Palestine.
'What did this argument mean? Was it necessary that a rebellion should simultaneously spread to all the parts of a territory before it could be concluded that it was premeditated?
The second argument on which the Commission based its views did not appear more conclusive.
The day before the outbreak of the disorder (see the report page 8o), the representatives of Jews and Arabs had met in conference to discuss the interests of Palestine.
The exchange of views had taken place "in a friendly spirit." This was a fact to which the Commission appeared to attach great importance, and it was all the more surprising in that everyone knew that Orientals, and among them the Arabs, in particular, were some of the best diplomatists in the world, and that they were very careful not to show their real thoughts by adopting a revealing attitude .
He felt it difficult, therefore, to understand why the Commission of Enquiry had concluded that there had been no premeditation and no organization in preparing for the disturbances, despite a number of its observations to which he thought it useful to draw attention.
"That the first of these motives is proved there can be no question; neither the Arab
Executive nor the Mufti has at any time endeavored to conceal the fact that the policy which, since 1918, successive Governments of His Majesty have followed in Palestine is regarded (APPENDIX VI 229) by them as being detrimental to the interests of those whom they represent. Their opposition to that policy has been unwavering.
The Arab Executive, from its institution, has opposed the policy and declined to accept the White Paper of 1922 (Cmd. 1700); there is no evidence that it has ever departed from the attitude which it then adopted. The Mufti, as a private person before his election to his present office, gave such expression to his feeling in the matter of policy in Palestine that he was implicated in the disturbances of
1920." (Page 71)
"The movement which he in part created became, through the force of circumstances,
a not unimportant factor in the events which led to the outbreak of August last, and to that extent he, like many others who directly or indirectly played upon public feeling in Palestine, must accept a share in the responsibility for the disturbances." (Page 75)
"That in many districts there was incitement and that in some cases those who incited were members of the Muslim hierarchy are facts which have been established to the satisfaction of Courts in Palestine; equally, it cannot be questioned that agitators were touring the country in the third week of August last and were summoning the people of certain districts to Jerusalem." (Page 75)
"Opposition to the Balfour Declaration is an important element in the policy of the
Palestine Arab Executive and, as we have already stated, it is our opinion that their feelings on this political issue might have provided a sufficient motive to have caused them to incite or to organize disturbance." (Page 78)
"We also accept the evidence that there was a marked increase in Arab activity after August 5th, and as we have already stated, it cannot be doubted that, during the third week of August, agitators were touring the country." (Page 79)
"His (Sulehi Bey al Khadra, member of the Arab Executive) general demeanor before us was such that we believe that he would welcome any opportunity of furthering what he regards as the just cause of Arab nationalism in Palestine." (Page 8o)
M. Van Rees wondered how the conclusions that there had been neither premeditation nor organization could be reconciled with the reservations and statements made by the Commission on pages 15 8, 159 and 164 in paragraphs 6, 11,
12, 1 3 and 45 (c).
APPENDIX VI 231
In its constant preoccupation only to accept legal and formal proofs, the Commission had reached a negative conclusion as soon as these legal principles appeared to it to be inconclusive.
It seemed to have ignored the fact that, in an Eastern country where feudal conditions of life still existed, effective proof against the traditional religious and other leaders of the people would very rarely be found. The Commission appeared not to have realized that, in those circumstances, a passive attitude on the part of the leaders was generally as significant in the case of a population worked up by agitation and excited
by an appeal to their religious feelings as active participation in the subsequent rising .
In his reference to the Commission of Enquiry, M. Van Rees had spoken only of the majority.
The minority consisted of a single member, Mr. Snell. In his report, that gentleman had adopted a far more logical attitude than that adopted by the majority. On page 172 he said that the causes of the disturbances of August "were due to fears and antipathies which, I am convinced, the Muslim and Arab leaders awakened and fostered for political needs." With reference to the Mufti, Mr. Snell said on the same
page:
"I have not the least doubt that he was aware of the nature of that campaign and
that he realized the danger of disturbances which is never absent when religious propaganda of an exciting character is spread among a Moslem people. I therefore attribute to the Mufti a greater share in the responsibility for the disturbance than is attributed to him in the report. I am of opinion that the Mufti must bear the blame for his failure to make any effort to control the character of an agitation conducted in the name of a religion of which, in Palestine, he was the head."
Mr. Snell went on to state:
"If the campaign of political agitation had for its objective the removal of grievances and the securing of safeguards for the future, the methods of propaganda adopted by the Arab leaders were, in my opinion, ill-chosen and futile; if, on the other hand, the campaign was designed to arouse Arab and Muslim passion, those who participated in it, knowing full well the results of like agitation in the past, cannot have been unaware of the possibility that serious disturbance would follow.
Though I agree, that the Arab Executive is not of necessity responsible as a body for the (APPENDIX VI 233) words or acts of its followers or even its individual members, I find it difficult to believe that the actions of individual members of the
Executive were unknown to that body, or indeed, that those individuals were acting in a purely personal capacity."
Mr. Snell next pointed out: (page 173)
"Finally, in regard to the campaign of incitement, I am unable to agree that the conclusions in the report acquitting the Muslim Religious authorities of all but the slightest blame for the innovations introduced in the neighborhood of the Wailing Wall . . . . It is my view that many innovations which followed thereafter, such as the construction of the zawiyah, the calling to prayer by the muezzin and the opening of the new doorway, were dictated less by the needs of the Moslem religion and the rights of property than by the studied desire to provoke and wound the religious susceptibilities of the Jewish people."
Mr. Snell finally repeated, on page 18o, that the feeling of hostility and animosity on the part of the Arabs towards the Jews " . . . . was rather the result of a campaign
of propaganda and incitement than the natural consequence of economic factors ."
After a close study of all the elements of the problem to which M. Van Rees had devoted considerable time, he had not the least doubt that the responsibility for what had happened must lie with the religious and political leaders of the Arabs. This profound conviction had caused M. Van Rees to associate himself entirely with the remarkably well expressed account of the matter that had appeared in an article written by M. William Martin, published in the Nouvelle Revue Juive for the month of April, 1930 (page 22).
The only result of that proclamation on the Arabs had been that they had maintained that the Jews were alone responsible for the sanguinary disorders, as could be seen from page 68 of the report of the Commission of Enquiry. In making such an inconceivably foolish statement, they did not realize that they were showing exactly the same mentality as that displayed in British India at the present time. Since Gandhi had openly declared civil disobedience, disorders had occurred which he pretended not to have desired but which must inevitably have occurred.
Nevertheless, it was still true that, in the eyes of his partisans and in his own eyes, the British (APPENDIX VI 235)
Government must be held responsible for the victims of the madness which he had let loose.
It was true, that in British India there were no Jews to whom the responsibility for what had happened could be attributed.
It was very difficult to believe that, in spite of its own doubts, to which M. Van Rees had just referred and despite the delicate manner in which those doubts had been expressed, the Commission had been able to conclude that there had been no premeditation or organization of the disturbances on the part of the Arab leaders. It was even more surprising that the Commission should have extended this conclusion to cover the Head of the Supreme Muslim Council, the Grand Mufti Haj Amin El Husseini, referred to in several quarters as one of the principal organizers of these disturbances.
On page 71 of its report, the Commission stated that the Mufti had been implicated in the troubles which had occurred in the month of April i 920. The accused had been condemned in his absence by the Military Court to a very severe term of imprisonment.
The Commission also quoted a letter dated August 22nd, 1929, on page 75 of its report inciting the Arabs in unequivocable terms to take part in the attacks on the Jews which were to begin on the following day. The Commission observed in this connection (page 76) that this incitement to attack the Jews had been wrongly attributed to the Mufti. It had confined itself, however, to that declaration and had refrained from stating whether the origin of the letter quoted had been made the object of serious enquiry.
On the other hand, the Commission noted on page 77 that the Mufti had not scrupled to bear false witness. The Commission, however, had drawn no conclusion from this.
Account should also be taken to two facts which M. Van Fees thought particularly significant.
According to a secret letter from the Chief of Police at Jerusalem dated August 23rd, 1929, a facsimile of which had been forwarded to the Permanent Mandates Commission, a black list had been drawn up as a result of a conference of police officials held on July 2nd that was to say, a little before the outbreak of the disturbance.
The first name on that list was that of Haj Amin El Husseini, the Grand Mufti.
In the British Parliament, the attention of the Government had been drawn to the fact that the Mufti had, on April 17th, 1930 sent a letter to his colleague Sheikh Mustapha Ghalaini, President (APPENDIX VI 237) of the Moslem Council at Beirut, urging him to incite the Arabs in Syria to rebel against the French authorities.

M. Van Rees considered that these facts, taken in conjunction with his previous statements, were not without importance for anyone who wished to arrive at the unvarnished truth
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THE JEWISH HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE THE GREAT BRITISH BETRAYAL OF THE JEWS


THE JEWISH HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE
THE GREAT BRITISH BETRAYAL OF THE JEWS
APPENDIX VI


THE HOME LAND CLAIM
Statement made by M. Van Rees, Vice-Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in Geneva, June 5, 1930
M. VAN REES thought it useless to draw conclusions from this, since they were obvious.
M. Van Rees, continuing, wished to examine the complaints of the Jews. No chapter of the Commission of Enquiry's report was devoted to the legal side of the position of the Jews in Palestine.
Only a passing reference was made to that situation, and there was no effort to explain the grounds on which the Jews inhabited Palestine nor up to what point are their demands must be regarded as legitimate.
Since any serious examination of the rights of the Jews to live and carry on their activity in Palestine was not to be found in the report, it was difficult not to draw the conclusion that this point of capital importance had not received in the report the attention which it deserved.
:4:
22I (222 THE GREAT BETRAYAL)
The Commission did not state that the Balfour Declaration was the basis of the presence of the Jews in Palestine and of their activities.
The Commission of Enquiry did not explain its views on the close connection between that Declaration and certain provisions in the Palestine mandate. It had confined itself to quoting them, but had refrained from giving any interpretation.
It had ended by recommending the British Government to explain more explicitly than had been the case in 1922 its policy with regard to the Jews. The most striking fact was that, although the report referred in many places to the official statements contained in the White Paper of June, 1922, the Commission seemed to have attached no importance to the basis of those statements which it did not even quote. Yet that basis was that "the Jewish people will be in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance" (see White Paper, page 30) .
Nevertheless, it was this statement of Mr. Churchill's which, by explaining the legal reasons for the re-establishment of the Jews in the country, furnished the key to that which was not clear in the report of the Commission.
The Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, as recorded in the Preamble and developed (APPENDIX VI 223) in Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and i i of the Palestine Mandate, had a very definite meaning.
It was not, as several persons had seen fit to interpret it, a mere gracious gesture, a mere public manifestation of indulgent pity toward the Jewish people.
It would be altogether too naïve to believe that this had been the only feeling inspiring Great Britain in her Declaration of November 2rid, 11917. It would be also equally naïve to believe that that declaration had been approved by all the Great Powers merely in order to please Great Britain or in order to show their sympathy for the Jews.
Interpreted in its own words and with the aid of the text of the mandate based upon it, the Balfour Declaration would be seen to be an act based on purely political considerations and designed to secure an eminently practical object.
That object had certainly not been the oppression of a people established in the country by another people, as the adversaries of the Declaration wished it to be believed, despite the reservations contained in the Declaration.
On the contrary, its object was the resurrection of the people established in Palestine. Its object was to arouse them from their centuries-old lethargy and to secure the social and economic development of the country, not by the efforts of the Administration alone, but by the active co-operation of a more energetic and more highly developed people.
In short, the real object of the Balfour Declaration had been the establishment, by the co-activity of the Government and of the Jewish people, of a social and economic order corresponding to the principles and requirements of European civilization, while at the same time respecting the rights and interests of the existing inhabitants.
It had been that reason, which, disregarding the other considerations relating to the primary interests of the Empire, had induced the Government to agree, in order to fulfill the mission which it had felt sure would be given to it at the end of the war, to allow the Jewish people to participate, not in the powers of administration of Palestine, but in the practical execution of that mission.
This conception appeared to be fully justified by the facts. It explained the reason why Mr. Churchill, as M. Van Rees had already pointed out, had been able to state that the Jewish people would be in Palestine "as of right"; or in other words, that that people would not enter the country as foreigners, but would belong to the Palestinian nation to be subsequently recreated.
It would further explain why Article 4 of the Mandate (APPENDIX VI 225) date officially recognized the Jewish organization as the organization representing the Jewish people and chosen to co-operate with the Government.
It further explained why Articles 6 and 7 referred to the special privileges enjoyed by
Jews in respect of immigration, the acquisition of Palestinian nationality and their establishment on empty land, subject to reservations regarding the rights and interests of other persons.
Finally, it explained why Article i i, of which the meaning was just as significant, expressly enjoined the participation of the Jews in the execution or exploitation of public works and services as well as in the development of the natural resources of the country.
All these provisions were closely interconnected.
They formed a single whole and clearly expressed the fundamental idea that to the work of civilization to be carried out in Palestine the Jewish element would contribute its moral and above all its material support, not in virtue of holding any kind of concession of an economic nature, but in virtue of its right to collaborate with the Administration. In this the Jewish activity formed an integral part of the economic evolution of Palestine, of which the mandate had been entrusted to the Mandatory Power and 'which was the primary condition of the political development of the country.
M. Van Rees thought it regrettable that this point had not been seriously considered by the Commission of Enquiry. It was even more regrettable that the special situation granted by the mandate to the Jewish element in Palestine appeared to have escaped the notice of the Administration itself to such a degree that the three statesmen whose names were specially connected with the Declaration of November 2nd, 1917-
Lord Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Smuts -had been led to state publicly that causes "which are still obscure have impeded the task of administration and consequently the full carrying out of the policy" (letter published by The Times, December 20th, 1929) .
It must be recognized that this was the, main substance of the Jewish complaints.
All the information which the Commission possessed regarding the manner in which the Mandate had been applied showed that the three statesmen whom he had just quoted had not been mistaken.
On the contrary, the fact was that, generally speaking, the clauses of the Mandate concerning the Jews had not, in practice, received that application which their authors might have expected; not, in the first place, owing to the voluntary (APPENDIX VI 227) opposition of the Administration, but in consequence, M. Van Rees thought, at any rate in part, of the misunderstanding of the special situation which the international obligations assumed by Great Britain had granted to Jewish people in Palestine.
At this stage, M. Van Rees would enquire whether the British Government substantially adopted the statement of the Shaw Commission to the effect that no premeditation and no organized revolt had occurred, for this point was not clearly stated in the British Government's memorandum.
Dr. Drummond Shiels replied in the affirmative.
The views of the British Government on this point were contained in that document .
M. Van Rees said that in that case he wished to explain his views on that part of the conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry.
As far as the question of premeditation was concerned, the Commission of Enquiry justified its conclusions by observing (paragraph 2 of its conclusions, page z58) that the disorders had not occurred simultaneously in all parts of Palestine.
'What did this argument mean? Was it necessary that a rebellion should simultaneously spread to all the parts of a territory before it could be concluded that it was premeditated?
The second argument on which the Commission based its views did not appear more conclusive.
The day before the outbreak of the disorder (see the report page 8o), the representatives of Jews and Arabs had met in conference to discuss the interests of Palestine.
The exchange of views had taken place "in a friendly spirit." This was a fact to which the Commission appeared to attach great importance, and it was all the more surprising in that everyone knew that Orientals, and among them the Arabs, in particular, were some of the best diplomatists in the world, and that they were very careful not to show their real thoughts by adopting a revealing attitude .
He felt it difficult, therefore, to understand why the Commission of Enquiry had concluded that there had been no premeditation and no organization in preparing for the disturbances, despite a number of its observations to which he thought it useful to draw attention.
"That the first of these motives is proved there can be no question; neither the Arab
Executive nor the Mufti has at any time endeavored to conceal the fact that the policy which, since 1918, successive Governments of His Majesty have followed in Palestine is regarded (APPENDIX VI 229) by them as being detrimental to the interests of those whom they represent. Their opposition to that policy has been unwavering.
The Arab Executive, from its institution, has opposed the policy and declined to accept the White Paper of 1922 (Cmd. 1700); there is no evidence that it has ever departed from the attitude which it then adopted. The Mufti, as a private person before his election to his present office, gave such expression to his feeling in the matter of policy in Palestine that he was implicated in the disturbances of
1920." (Page 71)
"The movement which he in part created became, through the force of circumstances,
a not unimportant factor in the events which led to the outbreak of August last, and to that extent he, like many others who directly or indirectly played upon public feeling in Palestine, must accept a share in the responsibility for the disturbances." (Page 75)
"That in many districts there was incitement and that in some cases those who incited were members of the Muslim hierarchy are facts which have been established to the satisfaction of Courts in Palestine; equally, it cannot be questioned that agitators were touring the country in the third week of August last and were summoning the people of certain districts to Jerusalem." (Page 75)
"Opposition to the Balfour Declaration is an important element in the policy of the
Palestine Arab Executive and, as we have already stated, it is our opinion that their feelings on this political issue might have provided a sufficient motive to have caused them to incite or to organize disturbance." (Page 78)
"We also accept the evidence that there was a marked increase in Arab activity after August 5th, and as we have already stated, it cannot be doubted that, during the third week of August, agitators were touring the country." (Page 79)
"His (Sulehi Bey al Khadra, member of the Arab Executive) general demeanor before us was such that we believe that he would welcome any opportunity of furthering what he regards as the just cause of Arab nationalism in Palestine." (Page 8o)
M. Van Rees wondered how the conclusions that there had been neither premeditation nor organization could be reconciled with the reservations and statements made by the Commission on pages 15 8, 159 and 164 in paragraphs 6, 11,
12, 1 3 and 45 (c).
APPENDIX VI 231
In its constant preoccupation only to accept legal and formal proofs, the Commission had reached a negative conclusion as soon as these legal principles appeared to it to be inconclusive.
It seemed to have ignored the fact that, in an Eastern country where feudal conditions of life still existed, effective proof against the traditional religious and other leaders of the people would very rarely be found. The Commission appeared not to have realized that, in those circumstances, a passive attitude on the part of the leaders was generally as significant in the case of a population worked up by agitation and excited
by an appeal to their religious feelings as active participation in the subsequent rising .
In his reference to the Commission of Enquiry, M. Van Rees had spoken only of the majority.
The minority consisted of a single member, Mr. Snell. In his report, that gentleman had adopted a far more logical attitude than that adopted by the majority. On page 172 he said that the causes of the disturbances of August "were due to fears and antipathies which, I am convinced, the Muslim and Arab leaders awakened and fostered for political needs." With reference to the Mufti, Mr. Snell said on the same
page:
"I have not the least doubt that he was aware of the nature of that campaign and
that he realized the danger of disturbances which is never absent when religious propaganda of an exciting character is spread among a Moslem people. I therefore attribute to the Mufti a greater share in the responsibility for the disturbance than is attributed to him in the report. I am of opinion that the Mufti must bear the blame for his failure to make any effort to control the character of an agitation conducted in the name of a religion of which, in Palestine, he was the head."
Mr. Snell went on to state:
"If the campaign of political agitation had for its objective the removal of grievances and the securing of safeguards for the future, the methods of propaganda adopted by the Arab leaders were, in my opinion, ill-chosen and futile; if, on the other hand, the campaign was designed to arouse Arab and Muslim passion, those who participated in it, knowing full well the results of like agitation in the past, cannot have been unaware of the possibility that serious disturbance would follow.
Though I agree, that the Arab Executive is not of necessity responsible as a body for the (APPENDIX VI 233) words or acts of its followers or even its individual members, I find it difficult to believe that the actions of individual members of the
Executive were unknown to that body, or indeed, that those individuals were acting in a purely personal capacity."
Mr. Snell next pointed out: (page 173)
"Finally, in regard to the campaign of incitement, I am unable to agree that the conclusions in the report acquitting the Muslim Religious authorities of all but the slightest blame for the innovations introduced in the neighborhood of the Wailing Wall . . . . It is my view that many innovations which followed thereafter, such as the construction of the zawiyah, the calling to prayer by the muezzin and the opening of the new doorway, were dictated less by the needs of the Moslem religion and the rights of property than by the studied desire to provoke and wound the religious susceptibilities of the Jewish people."
Mr. Snell finally repeated, on page 18o, that the feeling of hostility and animosity on the part of the Arabs towards the Jews " . . . . was rather the result of a campaign
of propaganda and incitement than the natural consequence of economic factors ."
After a close study of all the elements of the problem to which M. Van Rees had devoted considerable time, he had not the least doubt that the responsibility for what had happened must lie with the religious and political leaders of the Arabs. This profound conviction had caused M. Van Rees to associate himself entirely with the remarkably well expressed account of the matter that had appeared in an article written by M. William Martin, published in the Nouvelle Revue Juive for the month of April, 1930 (page 22).
The only result of that proclamation on the Arabs had been that they had maintained that the Jews were alone responsible for the sanguinary disorders, as could be seen from page 68 of the report of the Commission of Enquiry. In making such an inconceivably foolish statement, they did not realize that they were showing exactly the same mentality as that displayed in British India at the present time. Since Gandhi had openly declared civil disobedience, disorders had occurred which he pretended not to have desired but which must inevitably have occurred.
Nevertheless, it was still true that, in the eyes of his partisans and in his own eyes, the British (APPENDIX VI 235)
Government must be held responsible for the victims of the madness which he had let loose.
It was true, that in British India there were no Jews to whom the responsibility for what had happened could be attributed.
It was very difficult to believe that, in spite of its own doubts, to which M. Van Rees had just referred and despite the delicate manner in which those doubts had been expressed, the Commission had been able to conclude that there had been no premeditation or organization of the disturbances on the part of the Arab leaders. It was even more surprising that the Commission should have extended this conclusion to cover the Head of the Supreme Muslim Council, the Grand Mufti Haj Amin El Husseini, referred to in several quarters as one of the principal organizers of these disturbances.
On page 71 of its report, the Commission stated that the Mufti had been implicated in the troubles which had occurred in the month of April i 920. The accused had been condemned in his absence by the Military Court to a very severe term of imprisonment.
The Commission also quoted a letter dated August 22nd, 1929, on page 75 of its report inciting the Arabs in unequivocable terms to take part in the attacks on the Jews which were to begin on the following day. The Commission observed in this connection (page 76) that this incitement to attack the Jews had been wrongly attributed to the Mufti. It had confined itself, however, to that declaration and had refrained from stating whether the origin of the letter quoted had been made the object of serious enquiry.
On the other hand, the Commission noted on page 77 that the Mufti had not scrupled to bear false witness. The Commission, however, had drawn no conclusion from this.
Account should also be taken to two facts which M. Van Fees thought particularly significant.
According to a secret letter from the Chief of Police at Jerusalem dated August 23rd, 1929, a facsimile of which had been forwarded to the Permanent Mandates Commission, a black list had been drawn up as a result of a conference of police officials held on July 2nd that was to say, a little before the outbreak of the disturbance.
The first name on that list was that of Haj Amin El Husseini, the Grand Mufti.
In the British Parliament, the attention of the Government had been drawn to the fact that the Mufti had, on April 17th, 1930 sent a letter to his colleague Sheikh Mustapha Ghalaini, President (APPENDIX VI 237) of the Moslem Council at Beirut, urging him to incite the Arabs in Syria to rebel against the French authorities.
M. Van Rees considered that these facts, taken in conjunction with his previous statements, were not without importance for anyone who wished to arrive at the unvarnished truth
.
APPENDIX VII
THE PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER
PALESTINE
Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom



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Friday, August 11, 2017

Arabs will continue to fail to force Jews to be enslaved by Muslims. But then Islam is a failed philosophy 627 CE in Medina when the Arabs slaughtered us







Arabs will continue to fail to force Jews to be enslaved by Muslims.
But then Islam is a failed philosophy

627 CE in Medina when the Arabs slaughtered us because we declined to convert
628 CE in Khayber when the Arabs slaughtered us because we declined to convert
As Islam spread so did the slaughter of Jews and other non-Muslims.
1013 CE in Cordoba where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1033 CE when the Moroccans slaughtered us because we had our own city
1035 CE in Fez where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1066 CE in Granada where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1090 CE in Granada where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1146 CE in Marrakech where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1146 CE in Sijilmasa where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1146 CE in Fez where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1232 CE in Marrakech where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1247 CE in Menkes where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1275 CE in Fez where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1465 CE in Fez where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1492 CE in Touat where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1517 CE in Hebron were the Turks slaughtered us because we were Jews
1517 CE in Tzfat were the Turks slaughtered us because we were Jews?
1660 CE in Tiberias where the Druze slaughtered us for being Jews
1736 CE in Alger where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1776 CE in Basra when the Arabs slaughtered us because we declined to convert
1779 CE in Jaffa where the French slaughtered us for being Jews
1790 CE in Tetuan where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1785 CE in Tripoli where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1805 CE in Alger where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1815 CE in Alger where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1828 CE in Baghdad where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1830 CE in Tabriz where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1830 CE in Alger where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1834 CE in Hebron where the Egyptians slaughtered us for being Jews
1838 CE in Tzfat where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1839 CE in Mashhad where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1864 CE in Marrakech where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1867 CE in Barfurush where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1869 CE in Tunis where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1875 CE in Demnat where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1897 CE in Tripolitania where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1910 CE in Shiraz when the Arabs slaughtered for being Jews
1912 CE in Fez where we were slaughtered for being Jews
1925 CE in Damascus where the Turks slaughtered us for being Jews
1934 CE in Constantine where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
1941 CE in Baghdad where the Arabs slaughtered us for being Jews
In 1947 in Aden and Aleppo because Jews declared an independent country



The names of Jewish victims of Arab terror is Eretz-Yisrael,1873-1920 and one from 1851.http://myrightword.blogspot.co.il/2014/07/jewish-victims-of-arab-terror-1873-1920.html
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    1. Maybe STOP rewarding Arab violence. Just 2 early examples: the Churchill White Paper, and the exclusion of Jews from Hebron after the massacre.
    2.  
       
       
       
       
       
      2 Votes
      Those Muslim who want to chose peace and life can choose to listen to what Allah says in the Qu’ran and not to trees and rocks. And that is that Israel belongs to the Jews and that the bible is to be respected.
      Even the Qur’an says that God gave the Land of Israel to the Jews!
      It [the Qur’an] is “a confirmation of previous scriptures” (i.e., the Bible)
      [Qur’an: Sura 12, “Joseph”, verse 112]
      “We [Muslims] believe in that which was revealed to us [the Qur’an] and that which was revealed to you [the Torah]. Our God and your God is one. To Him we surrender ourselves”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 29, “The Spider”, verse 47]
      “Enter, My People, the Holy Land which Allah has assigned for you. Do not turn back, or you shall be ruined”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 5, “The Table, verse 21]
      “We [Allah] settled the Israelites in a blessed land and provided them with good things”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 10, “Jonah”, verse 93]
      “Pharoah sought to scare them [the Jews] out of the land [of Israel]: but We [Allah] drowned him, together with all who were with him. Then We said to the Israelites: ‘Dwell in this land. When the promise of the hereafter comes to be fulfilled, We shall assemble you all together [in the Land of Israel in the End of Days]”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 17, “The Night Journey”, verse 103]
      “it was Our [Allah’s] will to favour those who were oppressed [the Jews] and to make them leaders of mankind, to bestow on them a noble heritage and to give them power in the land [of Israel]: and to inflict on Pharoah, Haman, and their army, the very scourge dreaded by their victims”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 28, “The Story”, verses 5-6]
      “We [Allah] gave the persecuted people [the Jews] dominion over the eastern and western lands which We had blessed [the east and west banks of the Jordan River]. Thus your Lord’s gracious word was fulfilled for the Israelites, because they had endured with fortitude; and We destroyed the edifices and towers of Pharoah and his people”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 7, “The Heights”, verse 137]
      “To Moses We gave the Scriptures, a perfect code for the righteous, with precepts about all things, and a guide and a blessing, so that his people might believe in the ultimate meeting with their Lord”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 6, “Cattle”, verse 155]
      “tell of Our servants Abraham, Isaac and Jacob: men of might and vision whom We made pure with the thought of the hereafter. They shall dwell with Us among the righteous whom We have chosen”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 38, “Sad”, verse 46]
      “Glory be to Him [Allah] who made His servants [Muhammed and El Burak] go by night from the Sacred Temple [of Mecca] to the farther Temple [of Jerusalem], whose surroundings We have blessed, that We might show him some of Our signs. He [Allah] alone hears all and observes all. We [Allah] gave Moses the Scriptures and made them a guide for the Israelites, saying, ‘Take no other guardian than Myself. You are the descendants of those whom We carried in the Ark with Noah. He was a truly thankful servant'”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 17, “The Night Journey”, verses 1-3]
      “We gave the Scriptures to the Israelites and bestowed on them wisdom and prophethood. We provided them with good things and exalted them above the nations”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 45, “Kneeling”, verses 16-17]
      “There is guidance, and there is light, in the Torah which We [Allah] have revealed. By it the prophets who surrendered themselves to Allah judged the Jews, and so did the rabbis and the divines; they gave judgement according to Allah’s scriptures which had been committed to their keeping and to which they were witnesses”.
      [Qur’an: Sura 5, “The Table”, verses 44-45]
      “And We said after him to the Children of Israel: Dwell in the land, then, when the time of the second promise comes, We will bring you all together as a mixed crowd”
      [Qur’an: 17:104]
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Thursday, August 10, 2017

British Mandate era in Palestine Destroying Arab terrorists Village - Posted by YJ Draiman



British Mandate era in Palestine Destroying Arab terrorists Village

British forces drove out the Ottomans in 1917, during World War I, and the British Mandate of Palestine was established in 1920. 
In the 1922 British census, Mi'ar an Arab Village had a population of 429, all Muslims.[12] The population increased to 543, still all Muslim, in the 1931 census and the inhabitants lived in a total of 109 houses.[13]
Mi'ar's residents participated in 1936–1939 Arab revolt against British rule, and the village became a center of rebel operations in Galilee.[14] The rebels often opened fired on British troops passing near Mi'ar, damaged roads in the vicinity to render them impassable by the British authorities, cut electrical cables, and planted landmines to hit British vehicles.[14] One of the authorities' controversial methods of suppressing the revolt was the blowing up of houses in a village where there was support for rebels.[14] On 26 October 1938, two British battalions launched a raid against Mi'ar and began dynamiting the large houses of the village.[14] They then demanded Mi'ar's mukhtar (headman) to issue a call to the village's rebels to surrender their rifles or else the dynamiting would continue.[14] No rifles were surrendered and the British resumed their dynamiting of the village's homes.[14] Mi'ar was entirely destroyed for its alleged support of the rebels.[15][16] A New York Times reporter present during the destruction wrote, "When the [British] troops left, there was little else remaining of this once busy village except a pile of mangled masonry."[14]

Arab/Palestinian village of Mi'ar being blown up by the British in 1938.
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Private Harry Potter (5251351) British Soldier killed by Arabs in Palestine


Private Harry Potter (5251351) British Soldier in Palestine

Harry Potter was one of 8 Potter children living in Kidderminster (near Birmingham) with his parents.  He left school at the age of 14 and worked for six months at the Glider Dome fixing roller skates.  He then went to work at a carpet factory where he was employed as a carpet creeler, which involved heavy physical work lifting packages of yarn on to carpet tufting machines.
  
At the age of 16 Harry traveled to Birmingham to enlist into the British Army even though he was still under age.  In order to join the army Harry lied about his age saying he was a year older than he actually was.  So on the 3rd January 1938 Harry Potter became a soldier in the 1st Battalion Worcestershire Regiment.

Harry's father, David, a cobbler, had been a soldier in the First World War and still had shrapnel lodged in the side of his head from the Battle of the Somme.

For the next 8 months Harry was training with other recruits of the Worcestershire Regiment. The family were all very proud of him, especially his mother.  His younger brothers were particularly excited when he came home on leave as he would always bring back biscuits to share.
In September, 1938, the 1st Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, which was then stationed in Aldershot, received orders to move to Palestine. The Arab revolt, which had been simmering for some time, reached serious proportions and it was necessary to reinforce the existing British garrison there.
Harry was very proud to be a soldier and set off for Palestine as part of the Worcestershire's Motor Transport division in September 1938 as he turned 17.
  

Harry Potter (age 17)

H.M.T. Neuralia

On the 14th September 1938, at the age of only 17, Harry sailed with the rest of the Worcestershire Regiment from Southampton on board the troop transport ship H.T. Neuralia and headed for the port of Haifa in Palestine (Israel).

After a remarkably calm voyage the 1st Battalion reached Haifa on the 26th September 1938, and the same day moved in Motor Transport down the coast road through Tel Aviv and Jaffa to Sarafand, where they bivouaced for the night.

Harry was a driver in the Motor Transport section of the Battalion.  His nickname was 'Crash Harry'!

The following day they moved on up the hill road to Jerusalem, where we took over a tented camp alongside the lines of 2nd Battalion The Black Watch.
  
The drive from Haifa to Jerusalem was something of an achievement, for the Battalion provided all the drivers for the 60 odd vehicles of all types which formed our convoy. Many of the drivers like Harry were inexperienced.
  
The Motor Transport section of the Battalion was split up on various detachments based in Bethlehem, Hebron (Battalion H.Q.), Isolation Hospital (at Hebron) and Deir Sha'ar.  In the first few months a number of Jewish drivers were also employed to help with the shortage of experienced drivers.

Harry's best friend in the Battalion was Private Holland who was from London.  The adjacent photo show Potter and Holland together in Palestine.  At the time Private Holland had suffered an injury to his left hand (seen bandaged).

During the spring of 1939, Harry Potter was now attached to 'D' Company who had been based at Deir Sha'ar since November 1938.

For a time Private Potter was stationed at a Pumping Station on the Beer-sheba Road, 6 miles south of Hebron.  The Station supplied water to Hebron.  This Pumping Station was commonly referred to as 'Pumpet'.  Harry made reference to this place in the letter home to his mother.  Although 'Pumpet' was a very popular billet with the men of the Worcestershire Regiment, it was also a very isolated spot that came in for sniping from the Arabs from time to time.
On the evening of 22nd July 1939, 'D' Company, returning from As Samu, engaged an armed Arab band at Kilometer 39 on the Hebron-Beer-sheba road.  This Arab gang had earlier ambushed an R.A.F. armored car. During the engagement Private Harry Potter (5251351) was killed and Privates Darby, Warwick, Pearson and Simmonds were wounded. Private Joseph Darby later died of his wounds in hospital in Jerusalem on 7th September 1939.
 

Private Potter and Private Holland
Shortly before Harry Potter was killed he wrote the letter below to his mother, which sadly arrived the day after the family were told of his death.

"Dear Mother,

In answer to your letter, I am getting on alright. I expect to be home for Christmas. If I am not it is a bit of bad luck.

At present I am in a place we call The Pumpet.  We have not got a lot of work to do at present and I hope you are alright.  I hope dad is still in work.  Tell Ken (his six year old brother) I am not forgetting his bike. I hope Alice (his older sister) is alright.

We have been going swimming a lot lately. You perhaps have been reading the papers.

I am not boasting but listen to the news on the wireless and listen to what work we in the Worcestershires have been doing. Well, I think that is all for now.

Cheerio - Crash Harry."
Note: Harry had promised to buy a bike for Ken his 6 year old brother, for his birthday.
 
 

Funeral procession of Private Harry Potter entering the Ramle Cemetery
  

Private Harry Potter burial


Private Harry Potter's army paybook which incorrectly shows his year of birth as 1919. Harry was actually born on the 16th September 1920 in Kidderminster. 
Photos of Harry Potter and his funeral kindly supplied by his nephew Alan Hinton
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