THE JEWISH HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE THE GREAT BRITISH BETRAYAL OF THE JEWS

THE JEWISH HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE

THE GREAT BRITISH BETRAYAL OF THE JEWS

APPENDIX VI

THE HOME LAND CLAIM

Statement made by M. Van Rees, Vice-Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in Geneva, June 5, 1930

M. VAN REES thought it useless to draw conclusions from this, since they were obvious.

M. Van Rees, continuing, wished to examine the complaints of the Jews. No chapter of the Commission of Enquiry's report was devoted to the legal side of the position of the Jews in Palestine.

Only a passing reference was made to that situation, and there was no effort to explain the grounds on which the Jews inhabited Palestine nor up to what point are their demands must be regarded as legitimate.

Since any serious examination of the rights of the Jews to live and carry on their activity in Palestine was not to be found in the report, it was difficult not to draw the conclusion that this point of capital importance had not received in the report the attention which it deserved.

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22I (222 THE GREAT BETRAYAL)

The Commission did not state that the Balfour Declaration was the basis of the presence of the Jews in Palestine and of their activities.

The Commission of Enquiry did not explain its views on the close connection between that Declaration and certain provisions in the Palestine mandate. It had confined itself to quoting them, but had refrained from giving any interpretation.

It had ended by recommending the British Government to explain more explicitly than had been the case in 1922 its policy with regard to the Jews. The most striking fact was that, although the report referred in many places to the official statements contained in the White Paper of June, 1922, the Commission seemed to have attached no importance to the basis of those statements which it did not even quote. Yet that basis was that "the Jewish people will be in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance" (see White Paper, page 30) .

Nevertheless, it was this statement of Mr. Churchill's which, by explaining the legal reasons for the re-establishment of the Jews in the country, furnished the key to that which was not clear in the report of the Commission.

The Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, as recorded in the Preamble and developed (APPENDIX VI 223) in Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and i i of the Palestine Mandate, had a very definite meaning.

It was not, as several persons had seen fit to interpret it, a mere gracious gesture, a mere public manifestation of indulgent pity toward the Jewish people.

It would be altogether too naïve to believe that this had been the only feeling inspiring Great Britain in her Declaration of November 2rid, 11917. It would be also equally naïve to believe that that declaration had been approved by all the Great Powers merely in order to please Great Britain or in order to show their sympathy for the Jews.

Interpreted in its own words and with the aid of the text of the mandate based upon it, the Balfour Declaration would be seen to be an act based on purely political considerations and designed to secure an eminently practical object.

That object had certainly not been the oppression of a people established in the country by another people, as the adversaries of the Declaration wished it to be believed, despite the reservations contained in the Declaration.

On the contrary, its object was the resurrection of the people established in Palestine. Its object was to arouse them from their centuries-old lethargy and to secure the social and economic development of the country, not by the efforts of the Administration alone, but by the active co-operation of a more energetic and more highly developed people.

In short, the real object of the Balfour Declaration had been the establishment, by the co-activity of the Government and of the Jewish people, of a social and economic order corresponding to the principles and requirements of European civilization, while at the same time respecting the rights and interests of the existing inhabitants.

It had been that reason, which, disregarding the other considerations relating to the primary interests of the Empire, had induced the Government to agree, in order to fulfill the mission which it had felt sure would be given to it at the end of the war, to allow the Jewish people to participate, not in the powers of administration of Palestine, but in the practical execution of that mission.

This conception appeared to be fully justified by the facts. It explained the reason why Mr. Churchill, as M. Van Rees had already pointed out, had been able to state that the Jewish people would be in Palestine "as of right"; or in other words, that that people would not enter the country as foreigners, but would belong to the Palestinian nation to be subsequently recreated.

It would further explain why Article 4 of the Mandate (APPENDIX VI 225) date officially recognized the Jewish organization as the organization representing the Jewish people and chosen to co-operate with the Government.

It further explained why Articles 6 and 7 referred to the special privileges enjoyed by

Jews in respect of immigration, the acquisition of Palestinian nationality and their establishment on empty land, subject to reservations regarding the rights and interests of other persons.

Finally, it explained why Article i i, of which the meaning was just as significant, expressly enjoined the participation of the Jews in the execution or exploitation of public works and services as well as in the development of the natural resources of the country.

All these provisions were closely interconnected.

They formed a single whole and clearly expressed the fundamental idea that to the work of civilization to be carried out in Palestine the Jewish element would contribute its moral and above all its material support, not in virtue of holding any kind of concession of an economic nature, but in virtue of its right to collaborate with the Administration. In this the Jewish activity formed an integral part of the economic evolution of Palestine, of which the mandate had been entrusted to the Mandatory Power and 'which was the primary condition of the political development of the country.

M. Van Rees thought it regrettable that this point had not been seriously considered by the Commission of Enquiry. It was even more regrettable that the special situation granted by the mandate to the Jewish element in Palestine appeared to have escaped the notice of the Administration itself to such a degree that the three statesmen whose names were specially connected with the Declaration of November 2nd, 1917-

Lord Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Smuts -had been led to state publicly that causes "which are still obscure have impeded the task of administration and consequently the full carrying out of the policy" (letter published by The Times, December 20th, 1929) .

It must be recognized that this was the, main substance of the Jewish complaints.

All the information which the Commission possessed regarding the manner in which the Mandate had been applied showed that the three statesmen whom he had just quoted had not been mistaken.

On the contrary, the fact was that, generally speaking, the clauses of the Mandate concerning the Jews had not, in practice, received that application which their authors might have expected; not, in the first place, owing to the voluntary (APPENDIX VI 227) opposition of the Administration, but in consequence, M. Van Rees thought, at any rate in part, of the misunderstanding of the special situation which the international obligations assumed by Great Britain had granted to Jewish people in Palestine.

At this stage, M. Van Rees would enquire whether the British Government substantially adopted the statement of the Shaw Commission to the effect that no premeditation and no organized revolt had occurred, for this point was not clearly stated in the British Government's memorandum.

Dr. Drummond Shiels replied in the affirmative.

The views of the British Government on this point were contained in that document .

M. Van Rees said that in that case he wished to explain his views on that part of the conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry.

As far as the question of premeditation was concerned, the Commission of Enquiry justified its conclusions by observing (paragraph 2 of its conclusions, page z58) that the disorders had not occurred simultaneously in all parts of Palestine.

'What did this argument mean? Was it necessary that a rebellion should simultaneously spread to all the parts of a territory before it could be concluded that it was premeditated?

The second argument on which the Commission based its views did not appear more conclusive.

The day before the outbreak of the disorder (see the report page 8o), the representatives of Jews and Arabs had met in conference to discuss the interests of Palestine.

The exchange of views had taken place "in a friendly spirit." This was a fact to which the Commission appeared to attach great importance, and it was all the more surprising in that everyone knew that Orientals, and among them the Arabs, in particular, were some of the best diplomatists in the world, and that they were very careful not to show their real thoughts by adopting a revealing attitude .

He felt it difficult, therefore, to understand why the Commission of Enquiry had concluded that there had been no premeditation and no organization in preparing for the disturbances, despite a number of its observations to which he thought it useful to draw attention.

"That the first of these motives is proved there can be no question; neither the Arab

Executive nor the Mufti has at any time endeavored to conceal the fact that the policy which, since 1918, successive Governments of His Majesty have followed in Palestine is regarded (APPENDIX VI 229) by them as being detrimental to the interests of those whom they represent. Their opposition to that policy has been unwavering.

The Arab Executive, from its institution, has opposed the policy and declined to accept the White Paper of 1922 (Cmd. 1700); there is no evidence that it has ever departed from the attitude which it then adopted. The Mufti, as a private person before his election to his present office, gave such expression to his feeling in the matter of policy in Palestine that he was implicated in the disturbances of

1920." (Page 71)

"The movement which he in part created became, through the force of circumstances,

a not unimportant factor in the events which led to the outbreak of August last, and to that extent he, like many others who directly or indirectly played upon public feeling in Palestine, must accept a share in the responsibility for the disturbances." (Page 75)

"That in many districts there was incitement and that in some cases those who incited were members of the Muslim hierarchy are facts which have been established to the satisfaction of Courts in Palestine; equally, it cannot be questioned that agitators were touring the country in the third week of August last and were summoning the people of certain districts to Jerusalem." (Page 75)

"Opposition to the Balfour Declaration is an important element in the policy of the

Palestine Arab Executive and, as we have already stated, it is our opinion that their feelings on this political issue might have provided a sufficient motive to have caused them to incite or to organize disturbance." (Page 78)

"We also accept the evidence that there was a marked increase in Arab activity after August 5th, and as we have already stated, it cannot be doubted that, during the third week of August, agitators were touring the country." (Page 79)

"His (Sulehi Bey al Khadra, member of the Arab Executive) general demeanor before us was such that we believe that he would welcome any opportunity of furthering what he regards as the just cause of Arab nationalism in Palestine." (Page 8o)

M. Van Rees wondered how the conclusions that there had been neither premeditation nor organization could be reconciled with the reservations and statements made by the Commission on pages 15 8, 159 and 164 in paragraphs 6, 11,

12, 1 3 and 45 (c).

APPENDIX VI 231

In its constant preoccupation only to accept legal and formal proofs, the Commission had reached a negative conclusion as soon as these legal principles appeared to it to be inconclusive.

It seemed to have ignored the fact that, in an Eastern country where feudal conditions of life still existed, effective proof against the traditional religious and other leaders of the people would very rarely be found. The Commission appeared not to have realized that, in those circumstances, a passive attitude on the part of the leaders was generally as significant in the case of a population worked up by agitation and excited

by an appeal to their religious feelings as active participation in the subsequent rising .

In his reference to the Commission of Enquiry, M. Van Rees had spoken only of the majority.

The minority consisted of a single member, Mr. Snell. In his report, that gentleman had adopted a far more logical attitude than that adopted by the majority. On page 172 he said that the causes of the disturbances of August "were due to fears and antipathies which, I am convinced, the Muslim and Arab leaders awakened and fostered for political needs." With reference to the Mufti, Mr. Snell said on the same

page:

"I have not the least doubt that he was aware of the nature of that campaign and

that he realized the danger of disturbances which is never absent when religious propaganda of an exciting character is spread among a Moslem people. I therefore attribute to the Mufti a greater share in the responsibility for the disturbance than is attributed to him in the report. I am of opinion that the Mufti must bear the blame for his failure to make any effort to control the character of an agitation conducted in the name of a religion of which, in Palestine, he was the head."

Mr. Snell went on to state:

"If the campaign of political agitation had for its objective the removal of grievances and the securing of safeguards for the future, the methods of propaganda adopted by the Arab leaders were, in my opinion, ill-chosen and futile; if, on the other hand, the campaign was designed to arouse Arab and Muslim passion, those who participated in it, knowing full well the results of like agitation in the past, cannot have been unaware of the possibility that serious disturbance would follow.

Though I agree, that the Arab Executive is not of necessity responsible as a body for the (APPENDIX VI 233) words or acts of its followers or even its individual members, I find it difficult to believe that the actions of individual members of the

Executive were unknown to that body, or indeed, that those individuals were acting in a purely personal capacity."

Mr. Snell next pointed out: (page 173)

"Finally, in regard to the campaign of incitement, I am unable to agree that the conclusions in the report acquitting the Muslim Religious authorities of all but the slightest blame for the innovations introduced in the neighborhood of the Wailing Wall . . . . It is my view that many innovations which followed thereafter, such as the construction of the zawiyah, the calling to prayer by the muezzin and the opening of the new doorway, were dictated less by the needs of the Moslem religion and the rights of property than by the studied desire to provoke and wound the religious susceptibilities of the Jewish people."

Mr. Snell finally repeated, on page 18o, that the feeling of hostility and animosity on the part of the Arabs towards the Jews " . . . . was rather the result of a campaign

of propaganda and incitement than the natural consequence of economic factors ."

After a close study of all the elements of the problem to which M. Van Rees had devoted considerable time, he had not the least doubt that the responsibility for what had happened must lie with the religious and political leaders of the Arabs. This profound conviction had caused M. Van Rees to associate himself entirely with the remarkably well expressed account of the matter that had appeared in an article written by M. William Martin, published in the Nouvelle Revue Juive for the month of April, 1930 (page 22).

The only result of that proclamation on the Arabs had been that they had maintained that the Jews were alone responsible for the sanguinary disorders, as could be seen from page 68 of the report of the Commission of Enquiry. In making such an inconceivably foolish statement, they did not realize that they were showing exactly the same mentality as that displayed in British India at the present time. Since Gandhi had openly declared civil disobedience, disorders had occurred which he pretended not to have desired but which must inevitably have occurred.

Nevertheless, it was still true that, in the eyes of his partisans and in his own eyes, the British (APPENDIX VI 235)

Government must be held responsible for the victims of the madness which he had let loose.

It was true, that in British India there were no Jews to whom the responsibility for what had happened could be attributed.

It was very difficult to believe that, in spite of its own doubts, to which M. Van Rees had just referred and despite the delicate manner in which those doubts had been expressed, the Commission had been able to conclude that there had been no premeditation or organization of the disturbances on the part of the Arab leaders. It was even more surprising that the Commission should have extended this conclusion to cover the Head of the Supreme Muslim Council, the Grand Mufti Haj Amin El Husseini, referred to in several quarters as one of the principal organizers of these disturbances.

On page 71 of its report, the Commission stated that the Mufti had been implicated in the troubles which had occurred in the month of April i 920. The accused had been condemned in his absence by the Military Court to a very severe term of imprisonment.

The Commission also quoted a letter dated August 22nd, 1929, on page 75 of its report inciting the Arabs in unequivocable terms to take part in the attacks on the Jews which were to begin on the following day. The Commission observed in this connection (page 76) that this incitement to attack the Jews had been wrongly attributed to the Mufti. It had confined itself, however, to that declaration and had refrained from stating whether the origin of the letter quoted had been made the object of serious enquiry.

On the other hand, the Commission noted on page 77 that the Mufti had not scrupled to bear false witness. The Commission, however, had drawn no conclusion from this.

Account should also be taken to two facts which M. Van Fees thought particularly significant.

According to a secret letter from the Chief of Police at Jerusalem dated August 23rd, 1929, a facsimile of which had been forwarded to the Permanent Mandates Commission, a black list had been drawn up as a result of a conference of police officials held on July 2nd that was to say, a little before the outbreak of the disturbance.

The first name on that list was that of Haj Amin El Husseini, the Grand Mufti.

In the British Parliament, the attention of the Government had been drawn to the fact that the Mufti had, on April 17th, 1930 sent a letter to his colleague Sheikh Mustapha Ghalaini, President (APPENDIX VI 237) of the Moslem Council at Beirut, urging him to incite the Arabs in Syria to rebel against the French authorities.

M. Van Rees considered that these facts, taken in conjunction with his previous statements, were not without importance for anyone who wished to arrive at the unvarnished truth