The Peace Process is Dead, Long Live the Peace Process - Oslo failed

Viewpoints

The Peace Process is Dead, Long Live the Peace Process - Oslo failed

Ami Isseroff

January 17, 2003

"I maintain that Oslo was not given even a day's grace. Immediately, even before the ink was dry, the one side planned jihad and the brainwashing for jihad, while the other planned settlements. Therefore, I don't think Oslo failed, because Oslo was never tried. (Israeli writer Amos Oz) [1]."
The above epitaph sums up the failure of the Israeli - Palestinian peace process initiated by the Oslo Declaration of Principles. The rest is exegesis, but it is important exegesis, that must be undertaken to help us understand the reasons for failure. For it is clear that while the Oslo process has failed, the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, and between Israelis and Arabs must continue. The Oslo agreements were only a small part of a larger historical picture.
The Oslo process has a number of remarkable achievements to its credit.. Both sides have come much closer to accepting each other than would have been thought possible in 1990. Israel has a peace treaty with Jordan as well as Egypt. The phrase "Zionist Entity" is close to extinct in the vocabulary of the Middle East, with some notable exceptions[2]. A majority of Israelis, even the right wing Likud party, have come to accept the possibility and even the necessity of an independent Palestinian state. Palestinian leaders say publicly that they accept the right of Israel to exist. History cannot be undone. The failure of Oslo and the Intifada will not erase these achievements. However, we must admit that there is no way forward on this path any longer. Those who do not admit this, or those who think that the process can be salvaged by some superficial changes or by "more of the same" are fooling themselves.
Partisans of each side have produced "Oslo Autopsies," and as usual, each side supplies justification for their positions rather than enlightenment. The Mideast Peace Process: An Autopsy [3] makes a very good case that the Palestinian leaders never wanted peace, documenting that case with statements of Yasser Arafat and other leaders in Arabic, throughout the Oslo period, reiterating that the final goal of the Palestinians is the destruction of Israel. Repeated terror attacks and unwillingness of PNA officials to stop those attacks undermined Israeli confidence in the peace process. Equally vehement in support of the Palestinian side, an article by Harvard researcher Sara Roy [4] points out the sins of the Israeli side, including settlement expansion, checkpoints and closures. These, coupled with a precipitous fall in standard of living in the Palestinian areas, sabotaged the peace process according to Roy. In the honored tradition of Middle East disinformation, each polemic ignores the misdeeds of their own side.
Others [5] have found fault with technical aspects of the Oslo process, such as the vagueness of the agreements, failure of leadership for peace, failure of leaders to meet with sufficient frequency, lack of a public peace process and lack of grass roots mobilization for peace. Variations on this approach may blame one side or the other, but they all share in common the notion that the process failed because of some technical faults in its implementation, or because of incorrect decisions taken by the leadership.
These approaches are representative, each gives part of the picture. Putting them together, it is obvious that as means to achieve peace, the agreements were poor and the process worse. This was not however, due to the incompetence of the framers. Rather, it was a reflection of underlying political and social realities. The identities of each side have been shaped by the conflict, and the national goals and values of each side, as presently defined, are incompatible with peace. The Oslo peace process failed because it conflicted with the national goals of each side, and the actions taken by both sides reflected those goals. These goals would have to be changed if the peace process was to have any hope of success, but the will to change, and mechanism for changing the goals was lacking. A small group of people on either side genuinely wanted the agreements to succeed and saw the future "peace" in the same way. The rest of the people, including the leadership, saw the agreements either as betrayal of the cause, or as a means to wage war by other (diplomatic) means. They defined "peace" as victory over the other side.
The Israeli and Palestinian Consensus
The agreements were framed quite well to serve national goals by both Palestinian and Israeli negotiators, who did the precise bidding of their masters. The leadership, rather than betraying the popular desire for peace, did their best to represent the popular desire for implementing the goals that are at the core of their national identities. These goals represent victory over the opposite side and not peace.
We should not mistake these goals for the most extreme viewpoints, that have been artificially accentuated by the outbreak of violence. The extremist views, such as those of the Hamas or the Kahanah Chai group, are frank declarations by each side of the desire to destroy the other side. The consensus goals are not framed in this way, but in decent and acceptable language. They do not define goals in terms of the other side at all, but rather point to the national aspirations of each side. The Palestinian refugees want the right of return. The Israelis want to the right to settle in all of Israel and need to guarantee security, as well as a unified Jerusalem.
From their respective points of view, each side is right, and holds their views without particular malice toward the other side. Both sides view themselves as "Righteous Victims," a phrase coined by Benny Morris [6], seeking redress of grievances.
The majority of Palestinians wanted to avenge the "catastrophe" of 1948 by massive return of the refugees of 1948 to Israel proper. An IPCRI poll shows that about 90% of refugees insist on this interpretation of "Right of Return" under UN Resolution 194[7]. At a personal level, this desire may not be vengeful, but simply a desire to return home and to seek restitution.
Professor Sari Nusseibeh, almost the only voice in Palestine who advocates giving up right of return in return for peace, has gotten almost no support in Palestine. He was prevented from speaking by angry students at An-Najjah University[8].
Commenting on Nusseibeh's views, the head of the PLO Political Department, Farouk Kaddoumi, remarked recently, "Only those who have experienced pain and suffering can have a political sense. I'm personally from Jaffa, and that's why I have a different feeling. Of course I'm still dreaming of Jaffa.... The oranges of Jaffa and their odor are still in my mind.[9]"
The practical meaning of return of the refugees, as both Israelis and Palestinians admit, is the end of Israel as a Jewish homeland. The goal of dismantling Israel through armed conflict is explicitly part of the constitution of the Fateh, the chief constituent of the Palestine Authority and of the PLO, and it remains their announced goal. Article 12 of the Fateh Constitution states as a goal of Fateh, "Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence." Moreover, the goals are to be achieved by violence. Article 19 states, " Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People's armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated." The constitution remains posted at the Fateh Web site atwww.fateh.net/e_public/constitution.htm.
Thus, while the PLO officials, including Arafat, had committed themselves to nonviolence and coexistence with Israel at Oslo, the Fateh organization that they head remained committed to armed struggle and destruction of Israel. A similar goal is stated in the constitution of the Hamas [10]. There is no major Palestinian group that has formally adopted the goal of coexistence with Israel, despite frequent assertions by PNA officials during the Oslo process that the Palestinians had decided on a real historic compromise.
The same sort of duality, expressed in other ways, exists on the Israeli side. The Israelis want to maximize Israeli territory, and have always viewed the possibility of a Palestinian state with somewhat justifiable distrust. The Israeli goal has always been acceptance of Israel as an independent state by the Arab world, on Israeli terms. For many Israelis, that means accepting permanent displacement of the Palestinians. For the majority of Israeli Jews, it means Israeli sovereignty over a united Jerusalem. Neither side is willing to admit any culpability in conflict. Each side sees themselves as the wronged party.
The result was that both sides viewed the agreements as a framework defining new rules for the continuation of the conflict, rather than a means of terminating the conflict. The goal of the Israelis was to maximize settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and thereby to maximize the area that would be retained by Israel. Accordingly, the settler population of the West Bank and Gaza rose from about 115,000 when the agreements were signed, to approximately 210,000 by the 2002[11]. These figures do not include the Jerusalem area, where there was also extensive building. Israeli strategy in the West Bank and Gaza was the same as Zionist strategy during the British mandate era - to obtain a Jewish majority in as many areas as possible, with a view to backing the claim to the land as part of Israel, to create "facts on the ground." This is seen in an evaluation written during the Nethanyahu era by Haim Gwirtzman of Bar Ilan University:
"Demographic data on the Israeli and Palestinian populations shows that there are two districts (the Jordan Valley and Judean Desert, and the southern Judean Mountains) in which there is already a Jewish majority today. There are three additional districts (Greater Jerusalem, West Samaria, West Benjamin) in which there no Jewish majority as yet, but in which the current settlement growth rate will allow the creation of a Jewish majority within a few years."[12]
Gwirtzman also saw the aquifers of the West Bank of Israel as vital to Israeli national interests, at least during an interim period. The goal was to maintain the interim period for as long as possible or perhaps indefinitely, in which time it would be possible to achieve the Jewish majority referred to above. The fact that dates and deadlines were not honored is not surprising therefore. Nor is it surprising that Israel was always vague about which parts of the West Bank and Gaza it might retain, and even Ehud Barak went about promising settlers, "We will remain in Ofra and Beit El forever [13]."
This program did not escape the notice of the Palestinians. Hasan Khadir, a Palestinian author familiar with Israel, claims that to Palestinians it seemed that Israel was using the Oslo process not in pursuit of a “two-state” solution to the conflict, but as a means of getting rid of densely-populated Palestinian areas while maintaining “an improved occupation[14].”
Among those Palestinians who had agreed to participate in the peace process, the avowed goal of many was, it seems, to obtain an agreement that would be a springboard for the destruction of Israel. In the 1960s, Fatah evolved a plan for a "Secular Democratic State" which would allow Jews who had arrived in Israel prior to 1917 to live alongside Palestinians. This plan was a respectable way of presenting the goal of destroying Israel. Apparently, it has not been abandoned. The current stance of the Fateh is that they are honestly negotiating for a Palestinian state alongside Israel, but that that state is a springboard for the secular democratic state:
"To us, the refugees issue is the winning card which means the end of the Israeli state....
...The transitory solution of the refugees issue in the future is through confederation with Jordan. I visualize the future in establishing a democratic state by peaceful means. This will come true when the Zionist illusion comes to an end, the thing that has begun to occur in the Labor Party and Merits [15]."
These views were consonant with those of Yasser Arafat, who stated on May 10, 1994 in Johannesburg:
"This agreement [Oslo], I am not considering it more than the agreement which had been signed between our prophet Muhammad and Quraish, and you remember that the Caliph Omar had refused this agreement and considered it a despicable truce...But the same way Muhammad had accepted it, we are now accepting this peace effort [16]."
The treaty of Hudaybiah with the Quraish was subsequently nullified when, according to the Qur'an, the Quraish violated the treaty, and Muhammad felt justified in attacking and destroying them.
More alarmingly, on January 30 1996, Yasser Arafat told a gathering of Arab diplomats in Stockholm:
"We of the PLO will now concentrate all our efforts on splitting Israel psychologically into two camps," Arafat reportedly declared. "Within five years, we will have six to seven million Arabs living on the West Bank and in Jerusalem. All Palestinian Arabs will be welcomed by us. If the Jews can import all kinds of Ethiopians, Russians, Uzbeks and Ukrainians as Jews, we can import all kinds of Arabs to us."
PLO plans, according to Arafat, were to "to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian State. We will make life unbearable for Jews by psychological warfare and population explosion; Jews won't want to live among us Arabs."
He told the diplomats, "I have no use for Jews; they are and remain Jews! We now need all the help we can get from you in our battle for a united Palestine under total Arab-Muslim domination."
The meeting, described by the settlers pirate radio station, Arutz-7, was  later denied by Arafat, but was confirmed by the Norwegian newspaper Dagen, which published new details regarding Arafat's speech under the front-page headline, 'Arafat Gave Speech about Israel's Destruction[17].'
PA Minister Abdul Aziz Shaheen stated, "The Oslo accord was a preface for the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestinian Authority will be a preface for the Palestinian state, which in turn will be a preface for the liberation of the entire Palestinian land[18]." 
Both sides also assumed that the other side would not keep agreements and could not be trusted. The attitude of the Israelis was summarized by former PM Ehud Barak after the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations. If Arafat had no use for Jews, then certainly Barak had not much use for Palestinians either:
"They are products of a culture in which to tell a lie...creates no dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category. There is only that which serves your purpose and that which doesn't. They see themselves as emissaries of a national movement for whom everything is permissible. There is no such thing as "the truth." [19]
There is no evidence that any real trust or "chemistry" developed. There was never any real process of dialogue it seems, only a meeting of adversaries on the battlefield. The negotiations were a way of waging war by other means. While participants talked about "win-win" strategy, they in fact based their strategies on quite the opposite concept.
To many Palestinians, the Oslo agreements were supposed to be the path to destruction of Israel. To the Americans, and to many supporters of the peace process, the agreements were supposed to lead to a cessation of terror, and to Israeli withdrawal and establishment of a Palestinian state. However, this may not have been the expectation of the Israeli government when the agreements were framed, and it is not the way the agreements were explained to the people. In discussing the Oslo Declaration of Principles in the Knesset in October 25, 1995 [20], Israeli FM Shimon Peres, soon to be Prime Minister, explained that no settlements need be evacuated, and that the final settlement would not necessarily lead to a Palestinian state. Replying to a question about whether or not there would be a Palestinian state, Peres said:
"Not necessarily. For example, it can also be a blueprint for a Benelux arrangement, a framework including demilitarized zones, even an arrangement for areas without sovereignty."
Replying to a question about settlers evacuating their homes, Peres said,
"The explicit answer is that nobody has been asked to give up his home. Contrary to Camp David, we conducted negotiations that do not require the evacuation of even one settlement.

The edifice we are building is based on a change in relations, not necessarily a change in locations..."
The people had definite expectations of the behavior of the opposite partners. The Israelis expected to live in peace with the Palestinians, given that they had renounced violence. The Palestinians expected a state and evacuation of the settlements. At the same time, the leaderships of both sides were telling their own peoples quite the opposite. Glorious phrases about dignity and peace of the brave in English, were accompanied by declarations such as those of Peres and Arafat in Hebrew and Arabic. Both sides were aware of the discrepancy, Yet neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli leaderships protested to the other side or took the matter up with the US. Both had resolved on an adversarial model rather than dialogue and cooperation.
Given conflicting statements, we can only judge intentions by actions. In trying to decide whether the English declarations of peace or the other declarations made in the local Semitic languages represented the real intent of the protagonists, we must look at what actually happened. The 100,000 settlers added and the tens of thousands of housing units built in the Oslo years by Israel are effective and mute testimony that Peres was telling the truth in the Knesset. The government carried out a policy precisely in keeping with the spirit of his remarks - no settlers would be evacuated, no Palestinian state could be created. At the same time, the Israel government was almost completely insensitive to provocative acts by settlers that were bound to inflame Palestinian public opinion. Following the massacre perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein on innocent victims in Purim of 1994 in Hebron, the government imposed a curfew on Palestinians rather than Israelis. In several cases, authorities looked the other way when violence, including murder, was directed at Palestinians[21]. Goldstein's massacre, in turn, was supposedly a reaction to a series of roadside ambushes and terror acts perpetrated against settlers by Fatah, even though the PLO had supposedly renounced terror upon signing of the Oslo accords. Neither side wanted peace as it might conceivably be understood by the other side, and neither side worked to make their people ready for peace.
Most of the leaders and the major institutions of both societies, and the majority of the populations, held mutually incompatible views and expectations of peace. They shared the delusion that the peace process was a mechanism that would cause the other side to acquiesce in its own destruction, or provide an internationally sanctioned mechanism for forcing them to do so, based on UN resolutions or treaty agreements and US pressure. This situation could not lead to peace as it is ordinarily understood.
Preparing for Final Status Violence
The time following the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles flew by. Neither side made any attempt to ready their people for peace or compromise. Constant terror attacks and political backlash forced postponement of critical deadlines. Both sides gave tacit or substantive encouragement to lobbies and groups whose goals were antithetical to peace. Neither side gave much encouragement to the small groups that favored peace, perhaps because public statements favoring compromise would sabotage the bargaining positions of each side in the adversarial model of negotiations. When you are bargaining for an item of apparel in the market, you do not encourage your wife to say how nice it is or how much she wants it.
In Israel, the government continued to fund the Yesha council, and the settler's pirate radio station, Arutz-7 continued to broadcast opposition to any compromise with Palestinians that would involve giving up settlements.
By the spring of 2000, the battle lines were drawn. The Yisrael B'Aliya center party, led by Nathan Sharansky, left the Barak government in advance of the Camp David talks, in protest over the possibility that the Oslo agreements would actually be implemented. The party is very proud of this stand, and has taken special care to emphasize it in their January, 2003 election advertisements.
For their part, the Palestinians encouraged a hard line stance at every level. Yasser Arafat sought to include Hamas and other groups in the PNA government ahead of the negotiations. Violence was in the air. A Fatah leaflet issued in spring of 1999 declared, "The protests will ignite the land under the settlers' feet and they will leave forever[22]."
What form would the protests" take?. Threatening statements had been made with increasing frequency in the latter years of the Oslo process. A Palestinian American academic and activist, Hisham Sharabi, stated in 1998:
What form would the struggle option take?
It would claim the right to all legitimate forms of struggle, from non-violent forms of resistance to classical forms of armed struggle. From a political point of view, however, non-violent struggle is probably the more effective one in the long run. Yet, if the present conditions of repression and humiliation continue, wide-scale violence could prove to be the more likely option. Opting for national struggle is bound to enhance uncontrollable individual acts of self-sacrifice, the ultimate power of the powerless.

Popular resistance, which is likely to bring back the intifada, will simultaneously lead to building alliances and grassroots organizations, like the ones that emerged spontaneously in the early days of the original intifada (which was snuffed out by the PLO leadership in Tunis). If this succeeds by the turn of the century, this new post-patriarchal liberation struggle will regain the human face of the first intifada and win the support of progressive forces the world over, including the support of progressive Jewish forces in Israel and the United States [23].
Stating that the national struggle is "bound to enhance uncontrollable individual acts of self-sacrifice" was an open invitation to legitimize suicide bombings, and the theme that such "acts of self-sacrifice" were due to repression and humiliation was repeated quite often. Sharabi's projection of the uprising was perhaps the frankest call for violence prior to the Intifada, but it was only one of many threats and "warnings" by Palestinians, including PNA officials, prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities. Sharabi also hinted at one of the motives for the violence: to wrest control of the process from PLO/PNA, to regain the "human face of the first intifada," which was "snuffed out by the PLO leadership in Tunis." The notion that PLO Tunis was responsible for the end of the first intifada seems quite prevalent in Palestinian circles, but there is no evidence for it.
The PNA sponsored annual Nakba day demonstrations commemorating the defeat of the Arabs in 1948 and calling for return of refugees to Jaffa, Haifa, Beisan (Beit Shean) Majdal (Ashkelon), Birsaba (Beersheba) and Isdood (Ashdod) among many other places in Israel. The demonstrations of 2000 were particularly violent and were accompanied by live fire from Palestinian "Police" as noted.
A variety of organizations agitated for "rights" of refugees and liberation of all Palestine. The Al-Awda (return) group in the USA was organized to prevent "traitors" from giving up refugee rights at the Camp David talks. The Badil refugee organization, was quite active in this respect, and their Al-Majdal magazine reported proudly in June 2000 [24]:
"The following interview with Tayseer Nasrallah (Yafa Cultural Center/Balata Camp; BADIL Board member; 1967 occupied Palestine) and Ahmad Othman (journalist; member of A'idoun Group; Lebanon) was conducted by BADIL in late May 2000 before the resumption of final status negotiations in Washington... The interview highlights the importance of refugee empowerment through strengthening of refugee initiatives, grassroots mobilization in defense of refugee rights, and building networks between refugees in the various countries of exile as well as between refugees and international NGOs and solidarity groups."
So, the Palestinians while entering final status talks, were encouraging grass roots activities to ensure that the talks would fail.
The nature of this "empowerment and grassroots mobilization is made clear from the following, in the same report:
"In our public rally organized in Balata camp in commemoration of the 52nd anniversary of al-Nakba, for example, we had some 5,000 participants and we stated publicly that anyone who surrenders the refugees' right of return is considered a traitor. This has influence on our leadership. I assume that public opinion and popular initiatives also influence the Palestinian negotiators, as long as we are sending a clear message. "
To the Palestinians, the Oslo accords were nothing but a sell out, to be prevented at all costs. This view was furthered by Palestinian organizations such as Badil. From the very same interview in Al-Majdal, we read:
"...Palestinian activists and the intellectual elite were divided into three groups:
The first group are those convinced of the Oslo negotiation process as the only feasible Palestinian option, given the recent powerful developments in the region and the world, most importantly the second Gulf War and its disastrous results, such as the destruction of Iraq, US control of the major Arab resources - especially petrol - and the establishment of a broad Arab alliance with US policy in the region.
The second group is opposed to the process, starting from Madrid to Oslo. In a situation of collapse of the political consensus versus the US supported Zionist project, both on the popular and official level, this group was able to attract considerable support from among the intellectual elite and the national circles in the Arab world. However, action taken by this circle has been restricted to verbal statements rejecting the Oslo process; it has remained unable to stop the collapse of the official Palestinian position by means of concrete political action.
The third group continues to monitor the developments on the ground, in order to determine points of Palestinian weakness and strength. It hopes to be able to trigger a popular initiative which would block the deterioration resulting from the concessions made by the official Palestinian leadership, and to re-build consensus around the principles of the cause of the Palestinian people in the homeland and in exile."
So the Oslo Peace Process was viewed as a "Zionist Project" that could at best be tolerated. Any concession to peace was viewed as "deterioration" that had to be blocked by an "initiative."
All of the talk about "win-win" strategy on both sides was a public relations effort for consumption by foreign audiences. The reality perceived by Israelis and Palestinians was quite different. In the minds of Palestinians the way was prepared for an "initiative" to defend their rights against the "US supported Zionist project" that is, the Oslo agreement, and to "trigger a popular initiative which would block the deterioration resulting from the concessions made by the official Palestinian leadership."

Barak and Camp David
The election of Israeli PM Ehud Barak was not so much an expression of faith in the peace process, as an expression of disgust with the incompetence of Benjamin Nethanyahu. From the Israeli point of view, Nethanyahu had achieved nothing other than angering the Americans, dividing Israelis and making important concessions to the Palestinians in the Hebron agreements and at Wye plantation, with nothing to show in return. Barak got a mandate for "peace with limited liability." To Israelis, the government of Ehud Barak represented a last desperate effort to put the peace process back on track, within very narrow limits, dictated by the distrust of Palestinian leadership that was now widespread.
Agha and Malley [25] in an influential series of articles in the New York Review of Books, depict the failure of the process as due to errors by Ehud Barak in negotiating with the Palestinians, and Palestinian impatience because Barak, like his predecessors, failed to implement key parts of the agreements. For example, they asserted:
"To begin, Barak discarded a number of interim steps, even those to which Israel was formally committed by various agreements—including a third partial redeployment of troops from the West Bank..."
Barak completed some of the redeployments on Jan 6 and March 21[26].
Agha and Malley also note that Barak never implemented the transfer of Abu-Dis and other areas in Jerusalem to the PNA. These were approved by the Israeli Cabinet on May 15, 2000 [27]. However, in the same week, Palestinian violence broke out in several places, triggered by the annual Nakba day ceremonies sponsored by the PNA [28] including live fire used by PNA police against Israelis. The violence forced postponement of the implementation of the Abu-Dis transfer. Likewise, it made it impractical to implement a third redeployment before the final status talks, which were now quite overdue.
Beyond these minor, specific points, it is difficult to imagine that a few, or even many errors in approach, technique or attitude by Barak in his short tenure of office would be enough to entirely destroy a peace process that enjoyed the backing of the United States and European Union. Agha and Malley provide a great many facts as starting points and background for the Barak period and the reasons for his approach: the implementation of Oslo had been delayed, Barak decided to concentrate on Syria first, Barak did not trust the Palestinians, Barak had difficulty selling serious concessions to Israelis, cardinal points such as the refugee issue were not discussed in advance. None of these things, however, occurred in a vacuum. It is noteworthy that Agha and Malley do not allude directly to the Palestinian violence that forced the postponements noted above and colored the political picture that Barak had to deal with.
Agha and Malley do note, in the same paragraph:
"He did not want to estrange the right prematurely or be (or appear to be) a "sucker" by handing over assets, only to be rebuffed on the permanent status deal. In Barak's binary cost-benefit analysis, such steps did not add up: on the one hand, if Israelis and Palestinians reached a final agreement, all these minor steps (and then some) would be taken; on the other hand, if the parties failed to reach a final agreement, those steps would have been wasted. What is more, concessions to the Palestinians would cost Barak precious political capital he was determined to husband until the final, climactic moment,"
But what concessions could he possibly make, if he had already sworn that Ofra and Bethel will be part of Israel forever and ever? Why did he have to husband his precious political capital so carefully? Because the concessions met with stiff resistance in Israel. As we shall see, only a minority of Israelis approved of the concessions made at Camp David, and a clear majority disapproved of the Taba proposal of President Clinton.
We can only believe that the negotiations failed because of some last minute technical errors if we ignore everything that came before the problems that occurred in 2000, which were typical of the entire process, and if we ignore some of the conclusions of Agha and Malley themselves. Agha and Malley noted:
"The war for the whole of Palestine was over because it had been lost. Oslo, as they saw it, was not about negotiating peace terms but terms of surrender[29 ]."
If that is so, then from the viewpoint of the Palestinians, the Oslo Process was totally discredited, and there was nothing that Barak or anyone else could do to save it. It echoes the sentiments expressed in Al-Majdal quite closely.
By the summer of 2000, the final settlement talks that should have been completed before 1999, according to the Declaration of Principles, were quite overdue. The stage was set for the final debacle. US President Clinton was pressing for final status talks in his term, and Ehud Barak had also staked his own political future on an agreement. The Palestinians had set September 13 as the date for declaring a Palestinian state, with or without an agreement, so an agreement was essential.
However, no agreement was in the offing, and indeed, no agreement could be possible, because neither side would agree to conditions that meant acquiescence in its own destruction. The Israelis could never agree to Right of Return, and the Palestinians could never agree to a state in separated bits of real-estate, without control over resources, air space and borders. The problems have been reduced to a difference of opinion about quantities, but that is an optical illusion. To the outsider, a half a percent of area seems to make no difference to anyone. But if the half a percentage of area cuts the state of Palestine in half, it is certainly very relevant[30]. Likewise, admission of even one refugee, accompanied by an admission of "Right of Return" by the Israelis, would eventually lead to pressure on Israel to implement all of that right. This admission was demanded by the Palestinians at Taba [31]. A right, once admitted, cannot be taken away. Its implementation can only be postponed due to extenuating circumstances.
Israeli and Palestinian leaders were faced with the necessity of reaching an agreement in 2000, and at the same time, the impossibility of reaching any agreement that would satisfy the other side, and also be acceptable to their own people. Ehud Barak chose to make the agreement subject to a referendum. At the time, polls showed that a majority of Israelis probably would not support the Camp David or Taba proposals. We can only guess at what would've happened had they come to a vote.
Palestinian leaders chose to deal with the problem a different way. They recognized that they would be unable to present to their people any deal that did not include Right of Return of the refugees as well as total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Since anyone giving up Right of Return would be branded a traitor, and since the punishment of traitors is well known, the fate of the negotiations was sealed. Accordingly, the Palestinians presented nothing at Camp David.
Regarding the Camp David talks, there are reports from supporters of both sides, blaming the failure of negotiations on the Israelis or the Palestinians, or on "mistakes" by both sides. One of the most widely quoted of these summaries is that of Agha and Malley, that insists that the talks failed because of "mistakes" by Ehud Barak. He did not meet face to face with Arafat, did not radiate warmth. Israelis did not present maps or made this or that error. Agha and Malley note however,
"Beyond that, much has to do with the political climate that prevailed within Palestinian society. Unlike the situation during and after Oslo, there was no coalition of powerful Palestinian constituencies committed to the success of Camp David.
The negotiators looked over their shoulders, fearful of adopting positions that would undermine them back home[32]."
What Agha and Malley wrote is exactly correct in view of the agitation by Badil and other groups, but Agha and Malley did not carry it to its logical conclusion. The conclusion is that the failure of the final status negotiations was not due to a "tragedy of errors" by Barak, but rather was the inevitable outcome of everything that had come before. The failure was not an accident. It was well prepared. It was a tragedy in the classic sense, caused by tragic flaws in men and societies that were unable to overcome their basic identities.
The negotiators could not negotiate about much of anything. They could not even grant the other side the minimal rights of self determination. On the Palestinian side, anyone who compromised about right of return would be branded a traitor, and of course, Israel could not agree to Right of Return. Israeli negotiators came ready to defend vital interests in water and security, and in areas of the West Bank where Israel had managed to establish a majority, as Gwirtzman had explained. Israeli negotiators believed, based on the record, that a Palestinian state would continue to harbor and even encourage groups such as Hamas, PFLP and Islamic Jihad, as well as refugee lobbies demanding right of return, and would do nothing to rein in terror activity by these groups in the future, as they had done nothing in the past. Therefore, a Palestinian state could easily become a haven for terrorists who would see it as a base for continuing to the next stage of "liberating" Palestine. That being the case, the Israelis could not offer the Palestinians real sovereignty.
The Israelis played a percentage game. The percentages of land offered were meaningless, because the Palestinian entity that would be created would not have real control over its land, and because they would never get the 92% or 97.5% or 99.44%. The percentages eliminated from discussion all of the Jerusalem area, and all of the area of the Dead Sea that had formerly been under Jordanian control, and all of the no-man's land areas. The percentages included a large desert area in the Jordan valley, on the "back" of the mountain ridge that runs along the eastern part of the West Bank. This area is about 20% of the West Bank. This land would be turned over to the Palestinians only after a certain number of years. The period varied from offer to offer, but the principle remained the same. The land would be turned over conditional on Palestinian compliance with other stipulations of the agreement. It was expected by the Israelis that the Palestinians would not comply, and therefore, they would never get the land. From the Israeli point of view, that was perfectly legitimate. That land is desert. It is not arable and hardly any Palestinians live there. There are a few Israeli settlements there. It is meant as a genuine strategic security asset, guarding control of the West Bank. It would be unthinkable to allow a hostile state to control this area, and there was every likelihood that the Palestinian state would be hostile. From the Palestinian point of view, this was unacceptable, and they were perfectly justified in their own suspicions. Nobody made any "errors."
Therefore, the negotiations were doomed before they started. The political climate in Palestinian society did not change by accident. The change was a result of deliberate PNA policy that gave free rein to extremist political groups such as Hamas, PFLP and to Islamic Jihad and to refugee groups such as Badil, who put out a powerful barrage of propaganda against the Oslo accords, perpetrated well timed terror attacks to sabotage implementation of the agreements, and called for "initiatives" to prevent any final settlement that would leave Israel intact.
Agha and Malley later wrote to the New York Review of books, "The fact is that Camp David and the talks that followed demonstrated that, at their core, Israeli and Palestinian interests are compatible[33]." They did not understand, or did not want to understand, the implications of what they had written before. Palestinians viewed the negotiations as surrender, and negotiators were boxed in by public opinion that demanded right of return. Public opinion that had been encouraged by the leadership. The fact is, that the talks were a masterful exercise in public relations, to obscure a basic incompatibility of interests behind talk about percentages and technical details. Palestinians wanted Right of Return and destruction of Israel, and the Israelis wanted to control the land and the destinies of the Palestinians. There was, in the end, no way to overcome those contradictions, and the violence that accompanied the end of the negotiations was an inevitable, and planned consequence.
There is abundant evidence, despite the conclusion of the Mitchell commission[34], that violence that began in September 2000 was planned and instigated by the PNA as a "spontaneous" uprising. In addition to statements quoted above concerning the desirability of violence, there is evidence of active planning.
In December of 2000, PNA Communications Minister Imad Al-Faluji said in a Gaza gathering, "The PA had begun to prepare for the outbreak of the current intifada since the return from the Camp David negotiations, by request of President Yasser Arafat, who predicted the outbreak of the Intifada as a complementary stage to the Palestinian steadfastness in the negotiations, and not as a specific protest against Sharon's visit to Al-Haram Al-Qudsi [Temple Mount]."
Al-Faluji continued: "The Intifada was no surprise for the Palestinian leadership. The leadership had invested all of its efforts in political and diplomatic channels in order to fix the flaws in the negotiations and the peace process, but to no avail. It encountered Israeli stubbornness and continuous renunciation of the [Palestinian] rights... The PA instructed the political forces and factions to run all matters of the Intifada ..." [35]
The intifada was "predicted" according to Faluji, but not planned. However, it was viewed as "complementary stage to Palestinian steadfastness in the negotiations," an instrument of state.
Though Faluji denied making the statements, similar statements were also made by Fatah Central Committee member, Sakhr Habash:
"In light of the information, [after] analyzing the political positions following the Camp David summit, and in accordance with what brother Abu Ammar [Arafat] said, it became clear to the Fatah movement that the next stage necessitates preparation for confrontation, because Prime Minister Barak is not a partner who can respond to our people's aspirations. Based on these assessments, Fatah was more prepared than the other movements for this confrontation. In order to play the role given to it, the Fatah coordinated its administrative, civilian and sovereign apparatuses, and was not surprised by the outbreak of the current Intifada... The Fatah movement believed that the phenomenon of comprehensive struggle would appear at the final settlement stage... [36] "
The intended purpose of the uprising is not entirely clear. Perhaps it was done to prevent the signing of an agreement, or to demonstrate to the disaffected that violence had been tried, and did not work, allowing an agreement to ultimately go forward. Perhaps it was done, as was discussed above, to return the leadership of the Palestinian community to West Bank and Gaza activists, as opposed to PLO Tunis leaders. Perhaps it was needed by the leadership in order to compete with the Hamas and Islamic Jihad. There is speculation that particular factions in the Fatah, led by Marwan Barghouti, wanted to take the leadership initiative away from the older generation led by Yasser Arafat. Another goal perhaps stemmed from the Palestinian perception that the Israelis held the upper hand due to military superiority. The Intifada, it was thought, would help level the playing field. Internationalization of the peace process was one goal, since the PNA felt that the US had unfairly sided with the Israelis[37]. A possibility that should not be neglected, is that groups such as the Fatah, whose ideology and identity were formed around armed struggle, felt they had to vindicate their ideology.
According to the above evidence, the Palestinians at least knew that the Intifada was coming. Sakhr Habash noted, " The Fatah movement believed that the phenomenon of comprehensive struggle would appear at the final settlement stage." This is not surprising if we remember that Fatah ideology is based on armed struggle, but it is somewhat odd considering that the PLO had given up violence in the Oslo accords, and since it was clear that the entire process was based on the premise that there would be no violence.
However the conclusive evidence that the Palestinian leadership kindled the Intifada is provided by Barghouti himself:
"Sincerely, when I arrived at the area of the mosque... I was dissatisfied with the small attendance and when friction did not occur, I became angry. We tried to create friction, but with no success..."
"... I saw within the situation a historic opportunity to ignite the conflict. The strongest conflict is the one that is initiated from Jerusalem..."
"...After Sharon left, I had stayed in the area for two hours with other well known people and we spoke about the character of the reaction and of how people should react in all the towns and villages and not only in Jerusalem. We made contact with all the factions."
"... I prepared a proclamation on behalf of the high Fatah committee in coordination with the brothers in which we called upon the people to react to what happened in Jerusalem. When I came back to Ramallah I continued the talks with the contacts I had gathered around me regarding the character of our activity and the continuation of the reaction.[38]'
Needless to say, the intifada and the Israeli reaction to it have confirmed the worst suspicions of each side regarding the other, and enhanced the political standing of extremists. The notion of transfer, once taboo as a racist ideology, became respectable in Israel after the assassination of transfer advocate Rehavam Ze'evi. Polls show increasing numbers of Israelis, up to 46% support the idea of transferring Palestinians and Israeli Arabs to other countries in order to ensure a Jewish majority in Israel [39]. The suicide attacks have made Palestinians anathema to most Israelis. The tightened closure, constant curfews and reoccupation of Palestinian cities and high casualty rates inflicted by the IDF have eroded the last vestiges of Palestinian good will toward Israelis. For the Palestinians, the consequences of the intifada, rather than any rational ends that made be gained, have justified the intifada and generated support for its perpetuation. For Israelis, the intifada has justified the policies of settler-advocates and hard-line Zionists.
Public Opinion Polls and the Peace Process
Some would have us believe that cynical and inept leaderships are thwarting the desire of Israelis and Palestinians for peace According to polls, Israelis certainly support peace with Arabs. Steinmetz center polls consistently show that 70 to 80% of Israelis support the peace process between Israel and the Arabs. Support for the Oslo accords is not as great, and has been eroded by the Intifada. In October of 1996, nearly 70% of Israelis favored the Oslo agreements or were neutral toward them[40]. By December 1999, this support had shrunk to about 60%[41]. By the end of 2002, only 46% favored the Oslo agreements or were neutral toward them [42].
The intifada has certainly eroded Israeli support for the Oslo agreements. However, even in 1996, only a minority, including Israeli Arabs were actually favorable toward the process, and in no case were people asked to give their opinions as to what concessions Israel could or should make for peace.
Though they show a willingness for some compromise, public opinion polls in Israel and Palestine are generally consistent with the proposition that Palestinians and Israelis have mutually opposed national goals. A JMCC Poll in 1999 reported that return of the refugees according to UN Resolution 194, as opposed to limited repatriation, was deemed essential to peace by 60% of Palestinians (including non-refugees) in the West Bank and Gaza [43]. A poll released in December 2002 shows that 47% believe the goal of the intifada should be total liberation of Palestine[44].
Publicity for a recent poll announced, "Majority of Israelis and Palestinians agree on terms of Palestinian State[45]." Examination of the poll results does not support this contention, nor the additional contention that Palestinians support nonviolence. Israelis were asked "If the Palestinians committed to stop using violence against Israel and in fact stopped all violence for an extended period, would you favor or oppose Israel allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state outside the 1967 borders, except for some agreed-upon land swaps?." 51% were in favor, 42% opposed, and the rest did not answer. In other words, about half the Israelis would be willing to return to the Barak formula, which is unacceptable to the Palestinians. 57% of Palestinians were opposed to a Fatah directive requesting a cessation violence. 48% of Palestinians favored continuing violence, even if stopping the violence temporarily would bring about a state such as the one above, with the addition of negotiations in good faith about other status issues. Only 42% were willing to commit to this temporary lull in violence in return for a state. Neither side was asked for opinions regarding recognition of Israel, refugees, cessation of violence or sharing Jerusalem [46].
Going into final status negotiations, neither Palestinians nor Israelis held positions that were likely to be acceptable to the other side. The leaders cannot be criticized for being unwilling to make peace, since their negotiating positions were consistent with those of the people, or more conciliatory. In July, 2000, 44% of Israelis believed that the positions of Barak at Camp David were too conciliatory, and only 35% believed they were appropriate [47]. The Steinmetz Center Peace index of December 2000 indicated that 57% of Israelis were against acceptance of President Clinton's Taba proposals as a whole. 77% objected to provisions regarding return of the refugees, and over 60% objected to giving up sovereignty in Jerusalem and over the temple mount [48]. In March of 2000, Palestinians were asked, "If the Israelis and Palestinians sign a permanent peace agreement based on "Two States for the Two Peoples" formula, from the point of view of the Palestinians will such agreement mean the end to their historical conflict with Israel?" About 65% said "no" or probably "no" while only about 25% said "yes [49]." Both sides also held incompatible views about refugees and Jerusalem.
Conclusion
The Oslo fiasco was not due to some technical errors in statesmanship as some would have us believe, nor can it be blamed exclusively on one side, nor can it be blamed only on the leaders who were thwarting the desires of the people.
The mass of evidence, of which we have examined only a small part, indicates that both Israeli and Palestinian leaders had definitions of peace that were incompatible with peace as it is ordinarily understood, and as it was understood by the other side. These goals reflected the consensus opinion in their respective societies. The governments did everything possible to rally the people around these national goals, and little or nothing to prepare them for peace.
On the Palestinian side, the popular consensus solidified around an independent state, right of return, recapture of East Jerusalem and removal of all the settlements. The leadership negotiating positions reflected these goals. On the Israeli side, the consensus was always solidly against the return of the refugees and division of Jerusalem. Though Israelis have come to accept the idea of a Palestinian state, that state is envisioned as something less than what the Palestinians wanted.
Wishful thinking or partisan analysis may support the notion that the people of one or both sides really wanted peace on mutually acceptable terms, and that only chance errors or the actions of the other side or "mistakes" of leaders caused the process to fail. Public opinion polls and election results show consistently that the positions adopted by leaders are, if anything, more conciliatory than those of the respective peoples, and even the more moderate segments took positions unacceptable to the other side. The massive Israeli settlement buildup, and the pledges by moderate leaders, both Peres and Barak, that settlements would remain in place, leave no doubt about the nature of the peace envisioned by Israelis. Euphemisms about "painful sacrifices" and polls that indicate vague assent to vaguely worded questions about concessions for peace cannot erase the facts. Settlement housing continues to be built, and the majority of Israelis voted for the governments that built those settlements. Settlement housing was built under Labor and Likud governments alike. On the Palestinian side, the repeated emphasis on right of return, prophecies of violence, talk of phased solutions and liberation of Palestine leave no doubt about sentiments and intentions. The continuation of terror attacks throughout the peace process, winked at by the PNA, speaks for itself, as do the statements and actions of Palestinian leaders regarding the intifada.
The Oslo accords failed because Palestinians and Israelis still have national goals that are incompatible with each others' existence as free peoples, and with peace. These goals are accepted by a large national consensus on each side, and are encouraged by leaders rather than discouraged, in order to give them strong bargaining positions in the negotiations. This situation should not be viewed as static and unchangeable however. The consensus created around intractable positions is supported by powerful lobbies on each side, operating within Palestine and Israel and in the Diaspora, as well as by foreign powers and Islamist extremist groups. These groups still have not internalized the idea that destroying the other side is impossible. The peace process will succeed if, and only if, the coalitions and organizations created to thwart it are dismantled or neutralized, and the consensus goals of both societies are changed.
_________
Notes

1. Reality Bites, Ari Shavit, Ha'aretz, January 10, 2003, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=250053
2. For example, from a recent Fateh Editorial, "The Road Map... Where to? "Sharon recalls the memory of Al-Hussain and Abbas missiles which had stricken the Zionist entity without any counter attack by a country that is heavily-equipped with mass destruction weapons"http://www.fateh.net/e_editor/02/road_map.htm
3. Neal Kozodoy ed, The Mideast Peace Process: An Autopsy. Encounter 2001. The book is replete with articles by David Bar-Ilan, Douglas Feith, Daniel Pipes, Norman Podhoretz and other pillars of the neoconservative Zionist right wing in the United States.
4. Sara Roy, WHY PEACE FAILED: An Oslo Autopsy, Current History, Vol. 101, No. 651, January 2002.
5. Gershon Baskin, "Why Oslo Failed," http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000017.htm
6. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999, Knopf, 2000.
7. The IPCRI study is on the Web at http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/prrn/papers/refugees_report0801.html
8. Nusseibeh forced out of an - Najah University, Jerusalem Post, Khaled Abu Toameh, January 14, 2003. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/A/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1042431606394
9. Khaled Toameh, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 4, 2003. Kaddoumi: "No difference between PLO and Hamas" http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/A/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1041677512005
10. The Fatah and Hamas constitutions or covenants are on the Web in many places, including http://www.mideastweb.org/history.htm
11. Figures for number of settlers are based on Israel government Central Bureau of Statistics and are given at www.fmep.org and www.peacenow.org.
12. Haim Gwirtzman, "The Settlement Map," http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/publications/maps/settleme.htm/
13. Jerusalem Post, June 4, 1999, Editorial, Begin Final Status Talks. http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/04.Jun.1999/Opinion/Article-0.html.
14. Danny Rubinstein, “The Palestinians See an Israel Not Ready for Peace,” Ha’aretz, December 20, 2001.
15. The Palestinian Refugee Issue From A FATEH Perspective http://www.fateh.net/e_public/refugees.htm
16. Ha'aretz, May 23, 1994 and cited in numerous sources on the Web. .
17. Cal Thomas, Exploding the Peace Process, Washington Times March 3, 1996 (Available on the Web at http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1996/96-D22at.html ) and Middle East Digest, March 7, 1996. This story was denied by Arafat, and a story in the Economist of March 16, 1996 cast doubt on it as well. The veracity of the story can be judged in terms of subsequent events and actions of Arafat and the PNA.
18. Al Hayat Al Jadida (PNA official newspaper), January 4. 1998.
19. Benny Morris , Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak), The New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15501.
20. Statement to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, October 23, 1995 http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01ko0
21. Samuel Heilman, Washington Jewish Week, Feb. 2, 1995. From the article, "Similarly, while most Jews denounced the mass shooting carried out by the Orthodox Baruch Goldstein, a significant minority continued to sing his praises and consider his action as the work of a pious zealot who was justified in what he did. Moreover, they have argued, that justification came not simply from situational ethics but from the halacha, Jewish law.
    
    Similar sentiments greeted the shooting of Khayed Salah, attributed by an Israeli court to Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who pleaded guilty to 'criminally negligent homicide.'"
22. Editorial, Begin Final Status Talks .Jerusalem Post, June 4, 1999.. http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/04.Jun.1999/Opinion/Article-0.html.
23. Hisham Sharabi, The Palestinians: Fifty Years Later. These remarks were delivered at a lecture on May 28, 1998 and published by CPAP in June 1998. www.alhewar.com/Sharabi.htm.
24. Strategies for the Defense of the Right of Return in the shadow of the Final Status Negotiations, Al-Majdal, June, 2000 issue (#6) www.badil.org/Publications/Majdal/2000/majdal6.pdf. From the same number of this journal, we learn about media efforts to ensure that the refugee issue remains an obstacle to peace:
    Radio Programs: Two radio series about the Palestinian refugee issue are providing information and a forum for discussion for tens of thousands of listeners in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon. Since the end of February, Radio Bethlehem 2000 has carried a weekly program covering initiatives and events of the week, reports about specific villages of origin including interviews with eyewitnesses of the 1948 expulsion, refugee related news, and interviews with politicians. At the end of May 2000 a partnership between Yafa Cultural Center in Balata Camp and Voice of Palestine radio has begun to carry a similar radio series.
    TV Series: A seven part series on the refugee "Return Visit" (see page 20f) to villages of origin was broadcast in late May 2000 to a viewing audience of at least 15,000 in the Bethlehem-Jerusalem-Hebron area..
25. Hussein Agha, Robert Malley, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, The New York Review of Books, AUGUST 9, 2001 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380; Hussein Agha, Robert Malley, Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak) New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002,http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15540; Reply in Benny Morris, Ehud Barak, Camp David and After—Continued, New York Review of Books, June 27, 2002. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15540.
26. Source - UN Permanent Committee on Palestine, http://www.palestine-un.org/news/YearinReview2000.html). The withdrawals were not well coordinated with the Palestinians, but they were carried out. This source lists the withdrawals as the second and third withdrawals, but according to the Israel foreign office, the last withdrawal listed listed as number three by the UN, in March, 2000, was the second withdrawal (see http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0hhx0).   The third outstanding issue, release of prisoners was not resolved.
27. Israel Cabinet announcement of May 15, 2000. See http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0hbw0
28. The violence received considerable attention at the time. See IDF statement at http://www.idf.il/english/news/press_conference_16may00.stm.
29. Hussein Agha, Robert Malley, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, The New York Review of Books, AUGUST 9, 2001 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380.
30. See Ami Isseroff, The Israeli Camp David II Proposals. http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid2.htm for a summary.
31. See The Taba Proposals and the Palestine Refugee Problem, http://www.mideastweb.org/taba.htm
32. Hussein Agha, Robert Malley, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, The New York Review of Books, AUGUST 9, 2001 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380.
33. Dennis Ross and Gidi Grinsteen, Camp David: An Exchange, The New York Review of Books, September 21, 2001 - Reply by Agha and Malley. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14529.
34. The Mitchell commission concluded: " Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity...." THE MITCHELL REPORT Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee http://www.mideastweb.org/mitchell_report.htm
35. Al-Ayyam, December 6, 2000; Similar claims in As-Safir, March 3, 2001, quoting a speech made in Ein El-Hilwe refugee camp.
36. Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, December 7, 2000.
37. A comprehensive review from a pro-Israel position is given by Alan Dowty and Michelle Gawerc, The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm, Meria, Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue3/jv5n3a4.html.
38. Al-Ayyam, London, September 29, 2001. More text from this interview:"I knew that the end of the month of September [2000] would be the last opportunity before the explosion, but when Sharon arrived at the Al Aqsa Mosque it was the strongest (most suitable) moment for the breakout of the Intifada. This is because the subject concerns Jerusalem, and even more it regards Al Aqsa. The meaning of this - setting fire to the entire region and specifically [due to the fact] that the issue of Al Aqsa inflames and ignites the sensibilities of the masses."
    "On the eve of Sharon's visit I participated in a TV panel, on a local TV station. I found this to be the right opportunity to call upon the public to go to Al Aqsa on the following morning because it is not possible for Sharon to arrive at the Temple Mount [El-Haram Al-Sharif] 'just like that' and walk away peacefully. I was determined, and early the next morning I went to Al-Aqsa."
    "Sincerely, when I arrived at the area of the mosque, I was disappointed by the people who had arrived. The gathering there consisted entirely of Palestinians of 1948, eight of them Israeli-Arab members of the parliament and over 60 other well-known people. I was dissatisfied with the small attendance and when friction did not occur, I became angry. We tried to create friction, but with no success - due to conflicts of opinions that emerged with other people surrounding the friction created at the Al Aqsa square at the time."
    "We did not need a war. The issue is completely different. War breaks out according to the decision of the president or the commander of the military. The Intifada however, was not ignited by a person or a group of people, but it evolved from reaching deeply into the feeling of the masses. There were those who were opposed to the conflict. At the same time, I saw within the situation a historic opportunity to ignite the conflict. The strongest conflict is the one that initiated from Jerusalem due to the sensitivity of the city, its uniqueness and its special place in the hearts of the masses who are willing to sacrifice themselves [for her] with not even thinking of the cost."
    ... After Sharon left, I had stayed in the area for two hours with other well known people and we spoke about the character of the reaction and of how people should react in all the towns and villages and not only in Jerusalem. We made contact with all the factions."... "While we were in the vehicle on our way to the Arab Triangle, I prepared a proclamation on behalf of the high Fatah committee in coordination with the brothers in which we called upon the people to react to what happened in Jerusalem. When I came back to Ramallah I continued the talks with the contacts I had gathered around me regarding the character of our activity and the continuation of the reaction."
39. Amnon Barzilai, Poll: 46% of Jews favor transfer from the territories, Haaretz, March 12, 2002 (in Hebrew). Posted at http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/haaretz1203.html
40. Steinmetz Center Peace Index Poll, October 1996, http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/p_9610.html
41. Steinmetz Center Peace Index Poll, December 1999, http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/Peace_Index/1999/English/p_dec_99_e.html
42. Steinmetz Center Peace Index Poll, December 2002, http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/Peace_Index/2002/English/p_dec_02_e.html,
43. JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 34 - Part One On Palestinian - Israeli Attitudes Towards Palestinian Refugees - December 1999. http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/1999/no34.htm/
44. Palestine Opinion Pulse Volume 3, Number 11 - December, 2002. http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/pop/02/dec/pop11.htm.
45. Poll: Majority of Israelis and Palestinians agree on terms of Palestinian state http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/A/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1039404006793
46. Program on International Policy Attitudes, Surveys on The Potential for a Nonviolent Intifada II http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/IsrPalConflict/NVINT2/Intif2_quest.pdf
47. Steinmetz Center Peace Index Poll, July, 2000, http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/Peace_Index/2000/English/p_july_00_e.html.
48. Steinmetz Center Peace Index Poll, December, 2000, http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/Peace_Index/2000/English/p_dec_00_e.html.
49. JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 36 - Part Two, http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2000/no36b.htm.

Israeli Defense Forces: 17 Miraculous Israeli Military Victories (May 2015) - Draiman

Israeli Defense Forces:
17 Miraculous Israeli Military Victories

(May 2015)

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IDF: Table of Contents | New Programs 2014 | Wars & Operations

The Battle of Mishmar HaEmek

On April 4th 1948, the odds were not in Israel’s favor. Outnumbered ten to three and with artillery shells raining down on them, a few hundred Jewish residents and soldiers managed to hold off about one thousand troops of the Arab Liberation Army. The Arabs had attacked the kibbutz, Mishmar Haemek, with the intent of taking it for the strategic location in between Jenin and Haifa. All hope seemed lost, yet surrender was not acceptable. Miraculously, the highly outnumbered Jewish forces managed to go on the offensive, successfully taking over the Arab villages surrounding the kibbutz. This attack led to the Arab Liberation Army’s retreat and was the last significant stand of the Arab Liberation Front in the Israeli War of Independence.

The Battle for Katamon

During the Independence War, Israeli forces reentered Katamon which was a key strategic position inJerusalem that Israel had failed to retake from the  Arab forces controlling it, just two days earlier. This time, the Israeli troops quickly captured the monastery that was being used as the Arab forces' base of operations and that was the end of the fighting, or so they thought... After a few quiet hours, a fierce counter-attack began. Although they managed to hold off the Arabs, the Palmach began to run low on supplies. Additionally, they suffered countless injuries including Platoon Commander Raful Eitan who was shot in the head. They needed to retreat, but no soldier could be left behind for torture and mutilation. It was decided that those wounded who could not make it out would be put in a room rigged with explosives. Two soldiers would stay behind and detonate the explosives when the Iraqi forces reached the monastery. In the meantime, the enemy forces had also suffered many casualties and were out of Ammo. Their surrender was near, but the Israeli Forces in the monastery had no way of knowing this. The Israeli soldiers were on their way out the door, when suddenly the words “don't retreat” echoed from a radio that was thought to be broken. The Arabs retreated. The Israelis stayed and reinforcements arrived to treat the wounded. Raful, the platoon commander, survived what should have been a fatal bullet wound to the head and was back in action, half an hour later! This, along with the battle being won, was nothing short of miraculous.

The Battle of Safed

In 1948, as their sovereignty over Palestine was coming to an end, the British were handing over the strategic high points of the city to the heavily armed Arab troops. Outnumbered and outgunned, the Israeli forces struggled battling over Safed for months. In late April, an artillery piece nicknamed “The Davidka” was delivered to the Jews. Surprisingly ineffective, the most notable feature of the Davidka was the tremendous noise it produced. A rumor quickly spread through the Arab ranks that the Jews had acquired an atom bomb, and the entire Arab community left that night. With their exit, morale deteriorated among the Arab troops, and the Haganah was able to secure the city.

Taking Back Mount Zion

During the Independence War, Ira Rappaport’s Israeli platoon fought the Jordanian military for Mount Zionand found themselves surrounded by hundreds with only twenty five bullets left. With a sad end seemingly near, the men agreed to go out with a bang and readied themselves to make good use of every last bullet. Then, just when the small platoon were about to face the inevitable, something incredible happened. The Jordanian soldiers dropped their weapons and began suddenly running away, screaming “ABRAHAM!”. Several years later, Ira would come across a familiar face with an unlikely answer, as to what had actually occurred on that miraculous day. This was a former Jordanian soldier who had fought against Ira on Mount Zion. According to him, his army all witnessed a vision of Abraham defending the Jews in the sky above the Israeli platoon and had no choice, but to drop their weapons.

Saving the Kibbutz

During the War of Independence, twenty-four homemade Israeli armored trucks and cars took a wrong turn on the way to aid a besieged Kibbutz, and crossed and accidentally entered Lebanon. They realized their mistake, when they ran into twenty brand new Syrian armored cars traveling with dozens of Syrian supplies trucks carrying ammunition and artillery. The Israelis immediately fired at the first Syrian truck and amazingly hit a tank loaded with gasoline, causing an explosion, which set fire to the following truck full of hand grenades. One by one, each truck in the Syrian convoy exploded. The loud booms could be heard for miles and the scared surviving Syrians abandoned their cargo. The Israelis had just enough people to drive the captured armored vehicles and Syrian weapons back. By the time they finally reached the Kibbutz, the Arab besiegers had already left. Apparently, after they heard rumors that the Israeli forces invaded Lebanon, they fled back toSyria. And that’s how one wrong turn saved an entire kibbutz. The skeptical may write it off as accidental, but when it comes to Israel there are no accidents.

The Attack on Degania

Shortly after the Independence War, nearly all of the Syrian forces stationed at Tel al-Qasr used two hundred armored Syrian vehicles including forty-five tanks to attack Israel’s oldest kibbutzim; Degania Alef (“A”) and Degania Bet (“B”). With no artillery, about seventy Israelis (most of them were kibbutz members which means they were not regular fighters) had virtually no chance of blocking a Syrian advance, but they wouldn’t go down without a fight.  When the tanks approached Degania Aleph, the minimal Israeli forces began to throw molotov cocktails and behold, an Israeli soldier made a direct hit on the first approaching Syrian tank. Suddenly, the entire Syrian column was turning around and fleeing, possibly believing that Israel had a large multitude of anti-tank weapons. When the Syrians hit Degania Bet, the Israelis were incredibly low on weapons, but quickly assembled two ancient French cannons and used them well against the Syrians’ 75 mm cannons, and 60 and 81 mm mortars. The use of Israel’s little artillery must have really taken the Syrians by great surprise. Why else would they retreat when they had Israel outgunned and outnumbered? Sometimes, the best explanation is the simplest one. Miracles really do happen.

The Preemptive Strike

In 1967, Egypt began moving large forces and heavy artillery to the Sinai desert. Next, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships and anyone bringing any military equipment to Israel. This was an act of war. WhenEgypt, Syria and Jordan formed a pact and placed their militaries on high alert for war, it became clear that conflict was inevitable. Israel had horrible odds. However, the Rebbe confidently declared, “G-d is guarding them (the people of Israel)” and “The people of Israel will emerge from the current situation with remarkable success.” And sure enough their success was more than remarkable, it was miraculous. Two hundred Israeli Air Force planes were heading towards Egyptian air bases and should have been shot down. Though flying very low to avoid being detected by Arab radar sites, a Jordanian radar facility was able to detect the unusual amount of aircrafts approaching the sea. Jordan quickly sent out the message, “Inab” (a code for war) to Egypt. Miraculously, however, the Egyptian coding frequencies were changed the very day before and Jordan was not yet updated. Still, the miracle of surprise was not enough. Egypt’s anti-aircraft ammunition was sufficient enough to destroy all the Israeli planes attacking. Miraculously, the order was not given to launch any of those missiles on the Israeli crafts. Israel accomplished her mission and took down half the Egyptian air force: two hundred and four Egyptian planes, the majority of which were in the Sinai Desert readying to attack Israel. With this battle, the Six Day War began.

The Battle of Ammunition Hill

This battle for an extremely fortified Jordanian military post in East Jerusalem was arguably the most furious battle of the Six Day War ‘67. Instead of an air strike that would ensure an israeli victory, they opted for a ground attack, using paratroopers, to minimize the risk of civilian casualties. However, the Israeli forces had incorrect intelligence suggesting the hill was being defended by a single Jordanian platoon, not accounting for the numerous underground bunkers throughout Ammunition Hill that made this battle so incredibly difficult. They sent a third of the amount they should have. This is the kind of serious mistake that should cost the military a battle and possibly the war, but not Israel. Despite their misinformation, Israel miraculously won this battle in the incredible time of just four hours! Ammunition Hill is currently a national memorial site.

Kusseima

To win the Six Day War, Israel needed to retake the Egyptians’ heavily fortified Kusseima outpost. The Egyptians were in control of powerful forces capable of a great counterattack, while the Israelis were weary from a full day of battle. As the Israeli Defence Forces drew near, they heard massive explosions. When they arrived they saw that the Egyptians had destroyed their equipment and abandoned the base, for no apparent reason! As the day continued, it became clear that the Egyptians were hastily abandoning many of their outposts and their supplies along with them. One mysterious report of the battle was from Egyptian soldiers who, when approaching the Israeli border, saw a gigantic hand come out from the sky.  Immediately terrified, they turned around and ran the other way, unable to deny that they were witness to a supernatural event.

Taking Back Jerusalem

Starting June 5th, days of violent battling ensued throughout the old city of East Jerusalem. On June 7th, an eerie silence befell the city when Jordanian firing stopped.  It was too quiet and so Israeli troops were dispatched to check for a trap.  However, their report was of no trap, but of a miracle. The city was empty, save for all the equipment that the Jordanian army left behind.  The Israeli forces entered East Jerusalem, and took the Temple Mount, reaching the Western Wall without even firing a single shot. The people of Israel had returned to the land again and again, but they never retook all of Jerusalem... not until June 8th, 1967.  On this day, Israel not only had the land, but had her holiest city of Jerusalem, for the first time in almost 2000 years. “The Lord says: I will return to Zion and dwell in Jerusalem,” -Zechariah 8:3

The Golan Heights Attack

At the end of the 6 Day War, to retake the Golan Heights, Israel had to win an uphill battle against a heavily entrenched and well fortified  Syrian army, consisting of seventy-five thousand troops. It was estimated that thirty thousand Israeli lives would be lost. Yet on June 9th, after just seven hours of heavy fighting, Israel had miraculously gained control of the main sectors. The next morning, the Israeli forces still expected another day of fierce fighting. The Syrians, however, had other plans. Before the Israelis even got to them, they pulled out of the Golan, fleeing frantically and leaving weapons behind. The mountains, which were once strategically used to murder Jews had fallen into the hands of the Jews. Having completed the final offensive, they signed a ceasefire.

Taking Tel Fakhr

Due to great casualties, an Israeli platoon was left with only twenty-five men. Nonetheless, what was left of the platoon continued to charge Tel Fakhr, in the Golan Heights. Little did they know, Tel Fakhr was maybe the most heavily fortified position Syria had. It had trenches, bunkers, and heavy wiring, machine guns, anti-tank guns, and mortars. Those Israeli soldiers did not stand a chance. That was until a miracle occurred. For no reason that makes any sense, a Syrian captain instructed his men not to fire on the Israelis until they reached the wiring. Before the Syrians knew it, they were too late. “The Jews are already inside, and we’ve taken heavy casualties,” they reported to their captain. Those who remained of the Israeli platoon were victorious, and continued up the Heights.

The result of the miracles of this war was the recapturing of the Western Wall and much of the land Israel has today; an Israeli victory in just six days.

Yom Kippur War

In 1973, while the entire country of Israel fasted for Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), one hundred thousand Egyptians invaded Israel from the south and over 1,400 Syrian tanks invaded Israel from the north. Although one can say that every war is a miracle, Israel surviving, let alone winning this war, is arguably more miraculous than most of her other war victories. With a significant portion of the Israeli military either in their homes or synagogues, Israel was nearly defenseless. Not only was Israel caught completely off guard and outnumbered, now the vast majority of her soldiers were at their weakest. Initially Syria was gaining territory and logic dictates that Israel should have lost this war, but by the end of the the Yom Kippur War, Israelsomehow managed to come out on top and her weakened troops managed to reach 20 kilometers into Syria!

The Valley of Tears

During the Yom Kippur War, a small impossibly outnumbered Israeli force held back a large portion of the Syrian army, for four days in the Golan Heights. The Syrians were armed with hundreds of tanks, but gave the Israeli forces a false sense of security revealing only a few of their tanks in battle formation for months before the massive attack they had planned. If this attack was successful they could have taken Israel. They had three infantry divisions and over a thousand tanks. At one point, it was said to be just three Israeli tanks against one hundred and fifty Syrian tanks. A sergeant, out of shells wanted to leave his position, but was ordered to stay put. With no ammo, he was up against impossible odds. It would take a miracle to save him; to save Israel, and that’s just what happened.  The Syrians retreated, just when the Israeli force was on the verge of collapse! It has been theorized that the Syrians didn’t know the tanks were out of shells and seeing only a few tanks changing positions, they may have believed that Israel had more tanks than they actually did. However, a Syrian soldier swears an army of Angels surrounded those few tanks Israel had and considering the rate of miracles surrounding the small country of Israel, that could truly be what happened in what is now known as, the Valley of Tears.

The Gas Attack That Never Was

During the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq threatened to use chemical weapons on Israel, a country which was not actively participating in the conflict. As Iraq bombarded Israel with rockets, the country prepared for the likely possibility of a chemical attack. However, one never occurred. Why? Strangely enough, wind patterns changed from the normal directions to blow East from Israel going directly towards Iraq. The U.S. military theorized that the odd weather changes likely served as the major cause for Iraq’s decision not to employ chemical warfare, since the winds would have caused any gas attacks on Israel to harm Iraq as well.

Thirty-Nine Rockets

In 1991, without any Israeli instigation, Iraq tried to provoke Israel into retaliating by firing 39 missiles intoIsrael. Despite this, Israel did not retaliate and miraculously managed to stay out of the Gulf War, much due toU.S. encouragement. Many Iraqi scud missiles were intercepted by Patriot missiles from the U.S, but not all of them.  Still, throughout all of the numerous strikes on the West Bank, there was not a single death. Two missiles disappeared. To this day, nobody has taken credit for preventing their strikes and they have never been found. Another missile struck a garbage dump and for some reason did not explode.  One missile landed just several feet away from a gas station, which could have caused devastation, but incredibly it also did not explode.  Multiple missiles missed Iraq’s intended targets, instead landing in the Mediterranean Sea. One of which had gotten thrown off course by some inexplicable strong winds. There were other missiles that did hit and did actually explode. One of these exploded between two buildings and completely destroyed both of them, but somehow not a single soul was lost in this strike.

Not everyone realized the magnitude of this miracle until tragedy struck when over 40 were killed in a single missile strike on a U.S. marine bunker in Saudi Arabia. Even today, there are sadly parts of Israel that are being hit by terrorist rockets and while miracles do not occur for everyone, the rate of miracles for this country is undoubtedly exceptionally high.

Massacre Averted

During summer 2015, it was discovered that Hamas had been using supplies given by Israel for civil projects, to build tunnels that would enable them to transport weapons and invade Israel. In the weeks before July 17th,Hamas terrorists scouted out the area which one of their tunnels would potentially end, near the farming village of Sufa. It was perfect. At the time, this was a populated area of farmers concealed by tall wheat. Israelwouldn’t stand a chance.  However, the terrorists didn’t count on the apparent power of faith. According to Jewish customs, there is a biblical mandate that requires farmers to harvest before taking a sabbatical year, in which it is forbidden to harvest in Israel. On July 17th, terrorists exited their completed tunnel only to find an empty open land. This attempted attack happen to occur just after the sabbatical year had begun and so, the religious farmers were no longer harvesting. Without the tall wheat for cover, the terrorists were quickly spotted and intercepted by the Israeli Defense Forces. A potential massacre was avoided because of this miracle. And looking at the history of Israel, it seems there are always greater miracles to come.

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Source: “Top 17 miraculous Israeli military victories,” Israel Video Network, (May 20, 2015)

Israel Defense Forces:
History & Overview

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IDF: Table of Contents | Wars & Operations | Chiefs-of-Staff

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was founded shortly after the State of Israel was established in 1948. It ranks among the most battle-tested and highly-trained armed forces in the world.

Logo of the IDF

The IDF's security objectives are to defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State of Israel; deter all of Israel's enemies; and, curb all forms of terrorism which threaten daily life.

Most soldiers in the IDF are Jewish, but the number of Christian recruits has been steadily climbing since 2012, when concentrated efforts to encourage their enlistment began. It is predicted that approximately 200 Christian recruits will join the IDF in 2015-2016.

In October 2014 the IDF topped Business Insider Magazine's list of most powerful militaries in the Middle East, and also the list of the top air force's in the entire world.  A close security relationship with the United States as well as a booming defense industry gave Israel an edge over the other countries on the list.  Israel has one of the most well-tested and battle ready armies in the world (they have fought in four major engagements since 2006), and can also mobilize it's fighting forces quickly due to the relatively compact size of the country.  The Israeli air force was ranked first in the entire world due to their "space assets, advanced fighter jets, high-tech armed drones, and nuclear weapons".  Chris Harmer, a senior naval analyst at the Institute for the Study of War was quoted in the Business Insider article stating that "Pilot to pilot, airframe to airframe, the Israeli air force is the best in the world". 

- IDF Doctrine
- Society & Service
- Terms of Service
- Foreign Volunteers

IDF Doctrine

To ensure its success, the IDF's doctrine at the strategic level is defensive, while its tactics are offensive. Given the country's lack of territorial depth, the IDF must take initiative when deemed necessary and, if attacked, to quickly transfer the battleground to the enemy's land. Though it has always been outnumbered by its enemies, the IDF maintains a qualitative advantage by deploying advanced weapons systems, many of which are developed and manufactured in Israel for its specific needs. The IDF's main resource, however, is the high caliber of its soldiers.

In preparing for defense, the IDF deploys a small standing army (made up of conscripts and career personnel) with early warning capability, and a regular air force and navy. The majority of its forces are reservists, who are called up regularly for training and service and who, in time of war or crisis, are quickly mobilized into their units from all parts of the country.

The IDF's three service branches (ground forces, air force and navy) function under a unified command, headed by the chief-of-staff, with the rank of lieutenant-general, who is responsible to the Minister of Defense. The chief-of-staff is appointed by the government, on recommendation of the prime minister and minister of defense, for a three-year term, which is usually extended for an additional year.

Except when combat duty is involved, men and women soldiers of all ranks serve side by side as technicians, communications and intelligence specialists, combat instructors, cartographers, administrative and ordnance personnel, computer operators, doctors, lawyers and the like. The IDF is responsive to the cultural and social needs of its soldiers, providing recreational and educational activities, as well as personal support services. Recruits with incomplete educational backgrounds are given opportunities to upgrade their level of education, and career officers are encouraged to study at the IDF's expense during their service. The integration of new immigrant soldiers is facilitated through special Hebrew language instruction and other programs. Active in nation-building enterprises since its inception, the IDF also provides remedial and supplementary education to civilian populations and contributes to the absorption of newcomers among the population at large. In times of national crisis or emergency, the IDF responds immediately with appropriate action and assigns trained personnel to fill essential jobs or carry out special tasks.

Society & Service

Service in the Israel Defense Forces is a measure of involvement in the country's life. Most men and single women are inducted into the IDF at age 18, women for two years and men for three, followed by service in the reserves, men up to age 51 and single women to age 24. The IDF announced in November 2014 that starting in July 2015 male mandatory service in the IDF will be cut by 4 months, with male soldiers now serving a total of 32 months. In addition to this, the mandatory service length for female soldiers is to be extended at the same time, in an effort to promote equality. During the same meeting in which these new service requirements were approved, discussions were also held in reference to raising the salaries of enlisted soldiers. 

Out of respect for their community's religious commitments, Orthodox women may be exempted, although many choose to perform 1 - 2 years national service in the civilian sector. Most ultra­Orthodox men are granted deferments while pursuing Torah studies, and those who serve in the IDF mainly fulfill religious functions.

In March 2007, a report issued by a ministerial committee on military service found that 43 percent of female draft candidates receive exemptions. Of these, 76 percent opt out of service for religious reasons, 7 percent are overseas, 8 percent have criminal records and 2 percent are married. Only 24 percent of men who are eligible are not drafted.

In essence, the society and army are one, as a broad spectrum of the population serves periodically over many years, with those in and out of uniform virtually interchangeable. Since soldiers often hold ranks not necessarily corresponding with their status in civilian life, the IDF has become a highly effective equalizer in the society and contributes greatly to integrating individuals from all walks of life. The IDF also helps new immigrants during their period of military service to acclimate to Israeli life in a framework wherein each person is undergoing the same process.

Over the years, the IDF has assumed a variety of national-social functions for the society at large; providing special services for new immigrants; upgrading educational levels of adults who were denied basic education in their countries of origin; supplying teachers to development towns; assisting in disadvantaged areas and responding to emergency situations in the civilian sector.

Chritstian individuals living in Israel also serve in the IDF and are actively recruited. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyayu spoke at an IDF Christian Recruitment forum in December 2014 and said that "We are brothers, we are partners – Christians and Jews and Druze and Muslims who defend the State of Israel". 

Terms of Service

Compulsory Service: All eligible men and women are drafted at age 18. Men serve for three years, women for 21 months. Deferments may be granted to qualified students at institutions of higher education. New immigrants may be deferred or serve for shorter periods of time, depending on their age and personal status on entering the country.

Reserve Duty: Upon completion of compulsory service each soldier is assigned TO a reserve unit. Men up age 51 serve 39 days year period time which can be extended in times emergency. Recent policy has been reduce the burden whenever possible and reservists who have served combat UNITS may now discharged at 45.

Career Military Service: Veterans of compulsory service meeting current IDF needs may sign up as career officers or NCOs. The career service constitutes the command and administrative backbone of the IDF. Graduates of officers' or pilots' schools or special military technical schools are required to sign on for periods of career service.

Foreign Volunteers

The Israel Defense Force features soldiers from over 70 countries, with over 1/4 of these recruits coming from the United States. These soldiers are known as "lone soldiers," and are placed in the same category as Israeli recruits who do not have a support network (orphans), and Israelis who'se parents are not in Israel year-round. As of Israel Independence Day 2015, there were approximately 3,484 soldiers in the IDF from different countries who had made Aaliyah. The number of foreign volunteers in the IDF increased by 330 between 2013 and 2014.  Nefesh B’Nefesh, an Israeli organization that works with recent Israeli immigrants, hypothesized that social media is to blame for this increase in foreign volunteers, as well as the increasing European tide of anti-Semitism . Women account for 30% of the lone soldiers, serving as combat soldiers as well as paramedics and in intelligence roles.

The first group of Chinese Jews to ever join the IDF suited up during Winter 2014, hailing from Kaifeng, China. Moshe Li, Gideon Fan, and Yonathan Xue, all aged 25, made aliyah to Israel in 2009 through the organization Shavei Israel. The men were originally rejected when they attempted to sign up at the IDF conscription office, but thanks to friends in high places the group of Chinese Jews were later accepted into the IDF.

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Sources: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
“IDF to cut male soldiers’ service time next year,” Times of Israel(November 11 2014); Shpigel, Noah. “Netanyahu Lauds Christians Serving in Israeli Army,” Haaretz (December 15 2014); 
Ferber, Alona. “Israeli Army Cites Rise in Number of Overseas Volunteers Joining Its Ranks,” Haaretz (April 22, 2015);
Freund, Michael. “From Kaifeng to the Kotel: Chinese Jews in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Post (August 8, 2015);

Israel Defense Forces:
Chiefs-of-Staff

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IDF: Table of Contents | Wars & Operations | History & Overview

Name	Years
Benny Gantz	2011 -
Gabi Ashkenazi	2007 - 2011
Dan Haloutz	2005 - 2007
Moshe Ya'alon	2002 - 2005
Shaul Mofaz	1998 - 2002
Amnon Lipkin-Shahak	1995 - 1998
Ehud Barak	1991 - 1995
Dan Shomron	1987 - 1991
Moshe Levy	1983 - 1987
Rafael Eitan	1978 - 1983
Mordechai Gur	1974 - 1978
David Elazar	1972 - 1974
Chaim Bar-lev	1968 - 1972
Yitzhak Rabin	1964 - 1968
Zvi Tzur	1961 - 1964
Haim Laskov	1958 - 1961
Moshe Dayan	1953 - 1958
Mordechai Maklef	1952 - 1953
Yigael Yadin	1949 - 1952
Yacov Dori	1948 - 1949

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Sources: Israel Defense Forces

Israel:
Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

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Israel: Table of Contents | International Relations | Peace Process

Reference History & Overview Founding of the IDF Evolution of Armed Jewish Defense Military Threats to Israel Military Balance in Middle East Israel's Nuclear Arsenal Yom Hazikaron (Memorial Day) The "Magen" Program September 2014 Change in Promotion Policies New Programs for 2014 17 Miraculous Israeli Military Victories 6 Made-in-Israel Disaster Relief Devices Roim Rachok Program Soldiers of the IDF Chiefs of Staff (1948-Present) General Staff Officers (2013) Soldiers "Missing in Action" Prisoners-of-War North American Volunteers Sar-el Volunteers for Israel Ethics & Doctrine Code of Ethics (Ruach Tzahal) Code of Tolerance Teaching Morality in Combat Acting Proper In the Heat of Combat Morals & Dilemmas of a Prisoner Exchange Joint Training US-Israel Infantry Training (2015) IDF Officer Training Program (2015) Greece-US-Israel Military Training(2014) US-Israel Air Force Training (2013) EU-Israel Air Force Training (2013) US-Israel Naval Training (2013) US-Israel Artillery Training (2010) NATO-Israel Military Training (2008)	Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot             First Chief: Yaakov Dori                Founded: 1948          Service Type: Conscription
	Units Infantry Corps Special Forces Armored Corps Air Force Navy Military Intelligence Counterterrorism Chaplaincy Corps Education & Youth Corps Medical Corps Ordnance Corps Liaison Division Spokesperson Arab & Bedouin Rescue Units National Defense College Women of the IDF Iron Dome Defense System	Wars & Operations Wars & Operations Casualties in Battle Humanitarian Operations Protective Edge (2014) Pillar of Defense (2012) Cast Lead (2008-2009) Second Lebanon War (2006) Second Intifada (2000-2005) Defensive Shield (2002) First Intifada (1987-1991) First Lebanon War (1982) Yom Kippur War (1973) Operation Entebbe (1976) War of Attrition (1967-1970) Six Day War (1967) Suez War (1956) War of Independence (1948)

Israeli Defense Forces:
14 New Programs in 2014

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The IDF: Table of Contents | Code of Ethics | The "Magen" Program

From its newest nuclear-capable submarine to vegan-considerate, leather-free boots and berets, here is a year-end list of 14 programs fielded during 2014, as translated from the official Israel Defense Forces (IDF) website:

1. Hot, healthy, low-fat meals ready to eat (MREs) supported forces for the first time in Israel's summer 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza.

2. INS Tanin, the fourth of six German-built, Israeli-equipped Dolphin-class submarines, arrived at its home base at Haifa on September 23.

3. New manned and unmanned Israel Air Force aircraft include:

• Samson C-130J, the first of its planned fleet of Lockheed Martin-built Super Hercules airlifters, arrived here in April.
• Lavi, the first five of Israel's new 30-aircraft squadron of Alenia-Aermacchi M346 jets, arrived here last summer, along with the first of four ground-based training systems.
• Star, the Elbit Systems-built Hermes 900 unmanned aerial system (UAS), achieved operational capability in Protective Edge.

4. New protective kit for infantry includes ceramic vest, helmet, goggles and ear-shields.

5. The "Ya'alom" (Diamond) Unit of IDF Combat Engineers fielded its first Foster Miller-built Talon 4 tracked ordnance disposal robot in support of Operation Protective Edge.

6. The C4I Branch integrated a new layer of connectivity into its digitized network for enhanced, cross-service, inter-disciplinary command and control.

7. New personnel-related norms and programs include:

• Special meals and leather-free footwear, berets and other equipment to accommodate sensitivities of vegan soldiers.
• Prohibition on use of oversized earphones.
• Permission for female soldiers to shave their heads, as is customary among male soldiers in many units.

8. Acquisition of two new, locally built tow vessels in support of air independent propulsion (AIP) Dolphin-class submarines.

9. The IDF Armored Corps debuted the Hatzav multi-mission tank round in Operation Protective Edge. The M329 anti-personnel/anti-materiel round is built by Israel Military Industries and is optimized for urban warfare.

10. The Israel Air Force used upgraded, US-built Patriot batteries in the world's first successful intercepts of enemy-launched unmanned aerial vehicles.

11. The IDF Medical Corps provided new personal, first-aid emergency kits for use in Protective Edge.

12. Israel's Homefront Command deployed a system for disseminating personalized text message warnings of incoming rocket threats.

13. The IDF Armored Corps concluded a major reorganization last year, which included retiring older-model Merkava tanks and equipping its storied 7th Battalion with latest, self-protected Merkava Mk4s.

14. Israel's C4I Branch fielded a new Decision Support System (DSS) during Operation Protective Edge.

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Sources: Defense News

Israel Defense Forces:
Wars & Operations

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IDF: Table of Contents | Infantry & Special Forces | Spirit & Ethical Code

Listed in Reverse Chronological Order

Op. Protective Edge (2014)	Op. Pillar of Defense (2012)	Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009)	Second Lebanon War (2006)
Palestinian War (2000-2005)	Op. Defensive Shield (2002)	First Intifada (1988-1992)	First Lebanon War (1982-1985)
Operation Opera (1981)	Operation Entebbe (1976)	Yom Kippur War (1973)	Op. Spring of Youth (1973)
Operation Isotope (1972)	War of Attrition (1967-1970)	Six-Day War (1967)	Suez-Sinai Campaign (1956)
War of Independence (1948)

Israel Defense Forces:
Infantry Corps

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IDF: Table of Contents | Air Force | Navy | Wars & Operations

	Givati Brigade One of the original IDF brigades, founded in 1947, Givati was disbanded in 1956 but reinstituted during the Lebanon War in 1983. Since then, Givati soldiers have taken part in all of Israel's major conflicts and have served for years on Israel's frontline with Gaza.		Kfir Brigade Despite being the newest IDF brigade - officially formed in 2006 - Kfir is the largest of all infantry units, comprising 6 battalions and a number of special forces. Kfir soldiers have taken the lead in the fight against Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza.
	Golani Brigade The IDF's most celebrated and widely known brigade, Golani was created just before Israeli independence in 1948 and has served in every war since. Golani special forces are known as one of the finest yet fiercest fighting forces in the entire world.		Paratroopers The paratroopers have earned a hard-won reputation for strict discipline, courage, initiative, dedication to duty and the highest standards of performance. They have consistently been at the forefront of the IDF during its wars and coflicts.
	Nachal Brigade Originally founded in 1948 as a special military unit that would combine infantry service with civilian work on a kibbutz, Nahal matured in 1982 as a purely infantry brigade and currently is considered one of the IDF's most reliable units.		Special Forces (Sayerote) The Israeli Special Forces are widely heralded as some of the finest specialized fighting forces in the entire world. These crack commando units specialize in elite naval, air and ground fighting as well as combat reconnaissance both inside and outside of Israel.

Israel Defense Forces:
Air Force

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IDF: Table of Contents | Infantry Corps | Navy | Armored Corps

Reference

History & Overview Overseas Volunteers in 1948 In the 21st Century Air Force Commanders IAF Museum Training in the IAF Inventory Louis Lenart

International Cooperation

EU-Israel Joint Air Force Training US-Israel Joint Air Force Training

Units & Branches

Aerial Firefighting Unit Air-Defense & Anti-Aircraft Forces C4I (Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence) F-35 Squadron Women in the Air Force

Combat & Operations

Air Force Record in Battle Complete List of Israeli Air Victories Israeli Flying  Aces War of Independence (1948) First Fighter Mission (1948) Sinai Campaign (1956) Six-Day War (1967) War of Attrition (1969) Yom Kippur War (1973) Air Raid on Syrian General Command (1973) The Entebbe Rescue Mission (1976) Raid on Iraq Nuclear Reactor (1981) Operation Peace for the Galilee (1982) Raid on PLO Headquarters in Tunis (1985) Rescue Operation Behind-Enemy-Lines (1986) Operation Solomon (1991)

Israel Defense Forces:
Navy

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IDF: Table of Contents | Infantry & Ground Corps | Air Force

Reference History & Overview Navy Volunteers in 1948 The Navy Sails Into a New Era Navy Commanders-in-Chief Service in the Navy Military Arsenal Patrol Boat Squadrons Missile Boat Flotilla Navy Commandos (Flotilla-13) Panther Helicopter Submarine Fleet

Major Operations Navy Through Israel’s Wars Intercepting Illegal Weapons Shipments The Battle of Latakia (October 1973) The Boats of Cherbourg (December 1969) Sinking the Emir Farouk (October 1948) International Cooperation U.S.-Israel Joint Naval Training NATO-Israel Joint Naval Training

Israel Defense Forces:
Armored Corps

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IDF: Table of Contents | History & Overview | Wars & Operations

The Israel Defense Forces' Armored Corps (חֵיל שִׁרְיוֹן) is one of the most storied forces in the IDF, having fought and played a decisive role in every one of Israel's major conflagrations.

The armored corps is made up of three active divisions, comprising a total of four brigades.

The 36th Armor Division, also known as the Ga'ash Formation, is the largest armored division. It is stationed on the Golan Heights under the IDF's Northern Command.

Within the 36th Division is the 7th Armor Brigade, also known as the Sa'ar (storm) Formation, which was the first armored brigade of the IDF and has participated in all of Israel's wars. The brigade’s fighting during the Suez War resulted in a breakthrough in how the army approached the character of armor warfare. The 188th Barak (lightning) Formation is also subordinate to the 36th Division. The Barak Brigade has participated in all of Israel's wars since the 1967 Six-Day War. During the Yom Kippur War, the brigade was the first line of defense in the first days of the war at the Southern Golan, and saw almost all of its officers killed in action. It was the last armor brigade to use the Centurion tank, converting to Merkava-3 tanks in 1992.

The 162nd Armor Division, also known as the Utzvat HaBarzel Formation, is subordinate to Central Command. The 401st Armor Brigade, also known as the Ikvot HaBarzel ("Tracks of Iron") Formation, is subordinate to the 162nd Division. It was created in 1968 in order to control the Suez Canal line. During theYom Kippur War, it faced the first line of attack in the canal and suffered heavy losses. During the First Lebanon War, it fought in the Southern force and one of its battalions participated in the Sultan Yaakov battle. During 2004-2005, the brigade’s Magach tanks were replaced by Merkava-4tanks.

The 366th Armor Division, also known as the Amud ha-Esh ("Pillar of Fire") Formation, is subordinate to Southern Command. It includes the 460th Armor Brigade, which is also known as the Bnei Or ("Sons of Light") Formation, and is the training brigade of the Armored Corps. It maintains two bases:  Shizafon, the school for armored corps' commanders, and Magen-Sayarim, where basic and advanced training is undertaken.

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Sources: Israel Defense Forces; Wikipedia

Israel Defense Forces:
"Code of Tolerance"

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IDF: Table of Contents | Code of Ethics | Wars & Operations

(1) At military swearing-in ceremonies, soldiers may pledge an oath on either the Tanakh, Bible or Koran. Jews, Muslims and Christians all serve together in the IDF with no discrimination based on religious faith.

(2) Since 1948, women have served side-by-side with male soldiers. The Equality Amendment to the Military Service Law states that “the right of women to serve in any role in the IDF is equal to the right of men.” Each year, 1,500 female combat soldiers are drafted into the IDF and 88 percent of all positions are open to women.

(3) Israel is one of 24 countries that allow gay individuals to openly serve in their armed forces. Sexual orientation does not stand as a barrier to receiving promotions or joining elite units.

(4) In 2001, the Women’s Affairs Advisor to the Chief of Staff was created in an effort to empower women and maximize the capabilities and opportunities of women serving in the IDF.

(5) While there is a compulsory military draft for Israelis, hundreds of Jews from around the world volunteerto serve the state of Israel every year.

(6) Additional vacation time is allotted to soldiers of all faiths and religious practices. For example, Bedouinand Druze soldiers are granted time off from the army to celebrate the religious holiday of Eid al-Adha with friends and family.

(7) In 2011, the IDF proudly welcomed its first-ever female major general, Orna Barbivai, who was promoted as commander of the Manpower Directorate. She holds the IDF’s second-highest rank, reporting directly to Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, IDF chief of staff.

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Sources: IDF Spokesperson; Photos Courtesy of the IDF

Israel Defense Forces:
Ruach Tzahal - Code of Ethics

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IDF: Table of Contents | Code of Tolerance | Wars & Operations

Ruach Tzahal (Literally, 'Spirit of the IDF') represents the values of the Israel Defense Forces and stands as the foundation for the responsibilities of Israel's army. This overarching ethical code, and the guidelines and operation resulting from it, shape the mode of action applied by all IDF soldiers and units, both in peace and at war.

During basic training, every IDF soldier studies and analyzes the code of ethics together with their commanders. It is customary for a framed copy of the code to be hung in every commanders office as a constant reminder of the IDF's values and guidelines.

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IDF Ethical Code Pamphlet given to all soldiers in basic training

Ruach Tzahal Draws from Four Sources:

• The tradition of the IDF and its military heritage as the Israel Defense Forces.
• The tradition of the State of Israel, its democratic principles, laws and institutions.
• The tradition of the Jewish People throughout their history.
• Universal moral values based on the value and dignity of human life.

From These Sources Come Three Fundamental Values:

(1) Defense of the State, its Citizens and Residents

The purpose of the IDF is to protect the existence of the state of Israel, its independence, and the security of its citizens and residents.

‬(2) Patriotism and Loyalty to the State

Service in the IDF is based on patriotism, commitment and devotion to the democratic State of Israel and to its citizens and residents.

(3) ‬Human Dignity

The IDF and its soldiers are obligated to preserve human dignity. All humans are to be valued, regardless of race, creed, nationality, gender, status or role

From These Fundamental Values Come Ten Additional Values:

(1) Human Life

The IDF serviceman will, above all, preserve human life, in the recognition of its supreme value and will place himself or others at risk solely to the extent required to carry out his mission.

The sanctity of life in the eyes of the IDF servicemen will find expression in all of their actions, in deliberate and meticulous planning, in safe and intelligent training and in proper execution of their mission. In evaluating the risk to self and others, they will use the appropriate standards and will exercise constant care to limit injury to life to the extent required to accomplish the mission.

(2) Purity of Arms

The IDF serviceman will use force of arms only for the purpose of subduing the enemy to the necessary extent and will limit his use of force so as to prevent unnecessary harm to human life and limb, dignity and property.

The IDF servicemen's purity of arms is their self-control in use of armed force. They will use their arms only for the purpose of achieving their mission, without inflicting unnecessary injury to human life or limb; dignity or property, of both soldiers and civilians, with special consideration for the defenseless, whether in wartime, or during routine security operations, or in the absence of combat, or times of peace.

(3) Personal Example

The IDF serviceman will comport himself as is required of him and will, himself, act as he demands of others, thoughtfully and dedicatedly, aware of his ability and responsibility to serve as a role model to those around him.

The personal example of the IDF servicemen is their acting as is demanded of them and as they themselves demand of others, their clear and convincing readiness to serve as an example to those around them, in their actions and comportment, to create, uphold and foster mutual identification and joint responsibility in properly carrying out their tasks and accomplishing their missions in all areas of military activity.

(4) Responsibility

The IDF serviceman will see himself as an active participant in the defense of his country and its citizens. He will carry out his duties decisively, resolutely and with vigor, within the limits of his authority.

The responsibility of IDF servicemen is their active partnership and their readiness to use their utmost abilities in the defense of the State, its sovereignty, and the lives and safety of its citizens, within the framework of authority granted them by the IDF. They will carry out their duties fully, diligently, and with determination, commitment and initiative, in clear awareness that they are answerable for any consequences.

(5) Comradeship

The IDF serviceman will always go to the aid of his comrades when they need his help or depend on him, despite any danger or difficulty, even to the point of risking his life.

The fellowship of IDF servicemen is their bond as comrades in arms. It is their unwavering commitment to each other, their readiness to extend appropriate assistance, to go to the aid of a comrade, and even risk their lives on his behalf. In all their actions they will uphold and strengthen the solidarity of their unit in full cooperation with other units, and in support of the overall goals of the IDF.

(6) Professionalism

The IDF serviceman will aspire to be familiar with and understand the body of knowledge pertaining to his military position and will master every skill necessary for carrying out his duties.

The professionalism of IDF servicemen is their ability to correctly perform their military duties through striving to constantly excel in and improve their unit's and their individual achievements. They will do so by broadening their knowledge, and increasing proficiency, based upon the lessons of experience and study of the heritage and by expanding and deepening their understanding of the body of military knowledge.

(7) Discipline

The IDF serviceman will execute completely and successfully all that is required of him according to the letter and spirit of his orders and within the framework of the law.

The discipline of IDF servicemen is their readiness to act to the full extent of their abilities, to carry out what is demanded of them completely, according to their understanding of the letter of the orders they have received, and successfully, according to the spirit of their orders. It is their readiness to obey orders amidst a constant striving to execute them with understanding and dedication. They will take care to issue only legal orders, and disavow manifestly illegal orders.

(8) Loyalty and Representativeness

The IDF serviceman will act with complete dedication in the defense of the State of Israel and its citizens, according to IDF orders, within the framework of the laws of the State and democratic principles.

The IDF serviceman will also constantly see himself as a representative and an emissary of the IDF. As such he will act solely on the basis of the authority he has been given and orders he has been issued.

The loyalty of IDF servicemen is their dedication, in all actions, to their homeland, the State of Israel, its citizens and armed forces, and their constant readiness to fight and devote all their power, even at the risk of their own lives, in the defense of the sovereign State of Israel and the lives and the safety of its inhabitants, according to the values and orders of the IDF, while following the laws and the democratic principles of the State.

The representativeness of IDF servicemen is their consciousness, expressed in all their actions, that the armed force placed in their hands and the power to use it are given to them only as members of the IDF and its authorized representatives, duly executing their orders in accordance with the laws of the State of Israel and is subject to its Government.

(9) Reliability and Trustworthiness

The IDF serviceman will strive in all his actions to fulfill his duties correctly and at the highest professional level, from exacting and thorough preparation to true, honest, complete and precise reporting.

The trustworthiness of IDF servicemen is their reliability in fully carrying out their charge, using their military skills, with the sincere belief and conviction that they are acting professionally. They are ready at all times to present things as they are, in planning, executing and reporting truthfully, completely, courageously and honestly.

(10) Perseverance in Mission and Dedication to the Pursuit of Victory

The IDF serviceman will fight and conduct himself with courage in the face of all dangers and obstacles; he will persevere in his mission courageously, resolutely and thoughtfully even to the point of endangering his own life.

The perseverance of IDF servicemen in their mission is their capability and readiness to fight courageously in the face of danger and in most challenging situations; to strive unremittingly to achieve the military goal effectively, with full regard for the particular circumstances, notwithstanding any difficulty, stress or adversity or even mortal danger. They will do so with proper judgment and with due regard for risks.

Basic Principles

1. The IDF serviceman will, in all his actions and conduct, express the basic values of the IDF:

Perseverance in the mission, comradeship, discipline, respect for human life, loyalty, personal example, professionalism, purity of arms, representativeness, responsibility, and trustworthiness, as defined above and as appropriate to the specific circumstances.

2. The IDF serviceman, when acting in the framework of his military role, will be ever cognizant that he bears responsibility not only for the outcomes of his acts and omissions, but also for the patterns of behavior which they help to create, whether by order or personal example, by direct or indirect influence, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

3. The IDF serviceman will view himself, in each of his actions, as bearing full responsibility for the lives and safety of the servicemen and all others who are dependent on his actions or decisions.

4. The IDF serviceman will be ready to place his own life at risk when confronting the enemy or to save human life to the extent required, but he will preserve his own life and that of others in all other military situations.

5. The IDF serviceman will take into account, in every practical context, not only the proper concern for human life, but also the influence his actions may have on the physical well-being and spiritual integrity and dignity of others.

10. The IDF serviceman will maintain the tradition of the IDF, will study the IDF's military heritage and will promote esprit de corps.

11. The IDF serviceman will carry out his military activities without obtruding his personal views in matters beyond his sphere of responsibility, authority and professional expertise. He will take special care not to inject his personal opinions on issues subject to public controversy of a political, social or ideological nature.

12. The IDF serviceman will make use of his military authority or status, whether command or professional, solely for the benefit of the IDF. He will never use his military authority or status improperly to advance a personal objective, or to go beyond the limits of his authority and responsibility, in letter or spirit, within or without the IDF.

13. The IDF serviceman will hold himself responsible for the outcomes of his orders. He will support those who have acted in accordance with those orders or as is proper, and will view himself as responsible for the patterns of behavior which he imposed.

14. The IDF serviceman will support his unit and its commanders in every way necessary to fulfill the unit's mission of building, promoting and employing military force. The serviceman will obey his commanders in accordance with the law and maintain respect for his commanders, peers and subordinates.

15. The IDF servicemen will never conspire to conceal any offense or mishap, and will not entertain any proposal to be party to such a conspiracy. When confronted with an offense or mishap, the serviceman will act as is reasonable and proper to correct the aberration.

16. The IDF serviceman who participates in a discussion or dispute dealing with an activity in which the IDF is involved, whether before, during or after its implementation, will express his views in accordance with his professional knowledge and conviction, with honesty, candor and courage.

17. The IDF serviceman will use the authority at his disposal towards others only as is fair, self-controlled, reasonable and professional. He will show due respect for the person and the privacy of those with whom he interacts.

18. The IDF serviceman will view his appearance in an IDF uniform as an expression of his loyalty to the values and basic principles of the IDF.

19. The IDF serviceman will use the force at his disposal, in all actr to correct the aberration.

16. The IDF serviceman who participates in a discussion or dispute dealing with an activity in which the IDF is involved, whether before, during or after its implementation, will express his views in accordance with his professional knowledge and conviction, with honesty, candor and courage.

17. The IDF serviceman will use the authority at his disposal towards others only as is fair, self-controlled, reasonable and professional. He will show due respect for the person and the privacy of those with whom he interacts.

18. The IDF serviceman will view his appearance in an IDF uniform as an expression of his loyalty to the values and basic principles of the IDF.

19. The IDF serviceman will use the force at his disposal, in all actions in the face of the enemy, manifesting perseverance in his mission, courage and judgment, always ready to carry out his duties despite danger to his life.

20. The IDF serviceman will be ready to do whatever is required, and even to endanger his own life, to come to the aid of his comrades or to recover wounded comrades from the battlefield.

21. The IDF serviceman will act, when confronting the enemy, according to the letter and spirit of the laws of war. He will adhere strictly to the principle of purity of arms and to the ethics of combat.

22. The IDF serviceman will treat enemy troops and civilians in areas controlled by the IDF in accordance with the letter and spirit of the laws of war and will not exceed the limits of his authority.

23. The IDF serviceman will act fairly with self-control, reasonably, and professionally, in carrying out the responsibilities of his position, in all his contacts with civilians in areas controlled by the IDF, whether in the course of battle or afterward. He will show respect towards the beliefs, values, sacred and historical sites of all civilians and military personnel as they deem proper and to the extent possible, in keeping with the values and basic principles of the IDF and in accordance with military needs and the given circumstances.

24. The IDF serviceman will fight and exert himself to the utmost, even placing his life at risk so as not to surrender to the enemy but to overcome him. He will not surrender as long as he has a chance of carrying out his mission. Even in the absence of such a possibility, he will not surrender as long as he has contact with his commander or the ability to extricate himself from his compromised position.

25. The IDF serviceman who, despite all efforts, has been taken prisoner will act according to IDF orders; responsibly, reasonably and honorably.

26. The IDF serviceman will give preference to promoting the IDF's goals, as is required of him, in accordance with regulations, orders, values and basic principles, over the advancement of the goals of any civilian body, in any instance of conflict of interests between the IDF's goals and those of that body.

27. The IDF serviceman, in all official contact with civilian bodies, will act professionally and without compromising the IDF's values, basic principles or honor.

28. The IDF serviceman may be involved in the activities of a commercial or civilian body only in accordance with the letter and spirit of existing orders and procedures, and within the limits of his position.

29. The IDF serviceman will refrain from receiving personal benefits as a result of his position, rank, status or actions. He will not request, nor will he agree to accept any favors from any agent, inside or outside the IDF, directly or indirectly, for himself or others, except in accordance with due orders and procedures.

30. The IDF serviceman will ensure that every public appearance, especially in the mass media, has prior approval, expresses outright and unreserved loyalty to the value and basic principles of the IDF, reflects the IDF's policies and decisions, and contributes to the public's confidence in the IDF.

31. The IDF serviceman will ensure that his behavior even in private circumstances cannot be interpreted as compromising the IDF's values or basic principles, does not detract from the public's confidence in the IDF, and will not contribute to the creation of patters and behavior that could harm the implementation of the IDF's values and basic principles.

32. The IDF serviceman, during his reserve duty, will act according to the same values and basic principles of the IDF as those that apply to servicemen in regular service.

33. The discharged serviceman may make private use of special or sensitive information which he gained or which came to his attention during his service only after he has received the proper authorization to make commercial media or other such use of such knowledge outside of the IDF framework.

34. The discharged serviceman may make use of his military status, including his reserve or retired rank, or may grant permission to others to do so, only in civilian contexts that do not compromise the IDF's values and basic principles, or its honor and the trust which it enjoys in the public mind.

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Sources:IDF Spokesperson, Israel Defense Forces

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